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INTRODUCTION

Gun homicides have declined dramatically since the 1990’s, 1 but gun violence remains a
major issue of public concern. Political leaders often propose longer criminal sentences for illegal
gun possession. They argue that sentence enhancements will decrease violence, even though
sentence enhancements are not well-supported by social science research.
*
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1

Jens Krogstad, Gun Homicides Steady After Decline in ‘90s; Suicide Rate Edges Up, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct.
21, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/10/21/gun-homicides-steady-after-decline-in-90s-suicide-rateedges-up/ [perma.cc/YW5R-A2X2].
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Many states have passed sentence enhancements for gun crimes and gun-carrying,2 and
multiple states continue to consider new firearm sentence enhancements. 3 These tough-on-crime
policies come at a high cost: the United States’ standing jail and prison population was 2.2 million
people at the end of 2013.4 The country spent more than $75 billion on corrections in 2008 alone. 5
Proponents of mandatory minimum sentencing and sentence enhancements believe that imprisoning
more people substantially reduces crime. Much is at stake in this debate: many lives hang in the
balance, including those of people who might be freed or imprisoned, and those of potential victims
of violence.
In October 2013, Jens Ludwig, director of the University of Chicago Crime Lab, published
a memorandum arguing that possession of illegal firearms was under-punished in Chicago.6 By
increasing the length of imprisonment for people caught illegally carrying firearms, he claimed we
could save lives and reduce violent crime. Ludwig claimed an apolitical position in the public
debate, insisting that his only role was to share the nonpartisan results of social science research.
This claim was enhanced by his role at the University of Chicago Crime Lab, a major research and
policy institution that works with Chicago political elites on violence prevention programs. 7
Ludwig’s estimates predicted dramatic declines in violence. But he did not account for the
many ways in which imprisoning people can lead to new violence. A deeper analysis of Ludwig’s
assumptions reveals that he fails to grapple with large, relevant domains of the “best possible social
science research,” leading to a badly skewed estimate.
In this Article, I describe the Chicago gun sentencing debate in which Ludwig’s
memorandum played a central role. I argue that Ludwig wrongly takes “incapacitative” crime
reduction for granted, failing to consider many ways in which imprisonment increases crime. Then,
2

Dana Goldstein, Politicians Still Say Longer Prison Sentences Prevent Gun Violence — But Do They?, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/10/14/politicians-still-say-longer-prisonsentences-prevent-gun-violence-but-do-they [perma.cc/UYT9-EVNJ].
3
See, e.g., Julia O’Donoghue, Lawmakers Consider Tougher Mandatory Sentences for Violent Crimes,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/03/mandatory_minimum_violent_
crim.html [perma.cc/K257-RZ9H].
4
LAUREN GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES, 2013 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf [https://perma.cc/EPF9-MXS9].
5
JOHN SCHMITT ET AL., CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES, THE HIGH BUDGETARY COST OF INCARCERATION
(2010), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/incarceration-2010-06.pdf (estimating federal, state and local corrections
spending in 2008) [https://perma.cc/LY7T-V6AM].
6

JENS LUDWIG, U. CHI. CRIME LAB, ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ILLINOIS
HB2265/SB2267: SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS FOR UNLAWFUL USE OF A WEAPON (UUW) OFFENSES (2013),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.404.8423&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/KV4T-J76Q].
7

University of Chicago Joins Collaboration with City to Reduce Youth Gun Violence, U. CHI. (Apr. 10, 2008),
https://news.uchicago.edu/article/2008/04/10/university-chicago-joins-collaboration-city-reduce-youth-gun-violence
(describing new Crime Lab partnership with City of Chicago to develop violence interventions) [https://perma.cc/L4CK4EDQ]; William Harms, Friday Webcast to Feature UChicago Crime Lab Forum with Key City Leaders, Experts, U. CHI.
(Feb. 8, 2012), https://news.uchicago.edu/story/friday-webcast-feature-uchicago-crime-lab-forum-key-city-leaders-experts
(explaining Crime Lab event bringing together local officials and political leaders and University of Chicago scholars)
[perma.cc/922X-AC4P]; Crime Lab Partnering with Police in Chicago’s Highest-Crime Districts, U. CHI (Feb. 15, 2017)
https://news.uchicago.edu/story/crime-lab-partnering-police-chicagos-highest-crime-districts (describing new Crime
Lab/Chicago Police Department project to embed analysts within police districts to analyze crime trends) [perma.cc/LX928KNF].
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I analyze Chicago neighborhood-level data to test the connection between gun-carrying
punishments and violent crime rates. Next, I argue that Ludwig’s advocacy is not apolitical, but has
political and ethical dimensions. Finally, I conclude with a brief discussion of the long legacy of
Ludwig’s memorandum.
In public debates over policy, social science research rarely speaks for itself. The “who”
and “how” of advocate and researcher participation shapes the questions asked, the values invoked,
and the conclusions reached. Ludwig’s memorandum—and the unusual public debate about the role
and motivations of social science researchers—presents an opportunity to consider both the research
and the researcher simultaneously.
I. CHICAGO IN THE SPOTLIGHT: THE SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT DEBATE

Chicago is known for deadly gun violence, locally and nationally. The city has been
referred to as the “murder capital” of the United States, 8 even though several large cities have
substantially higher homicide rates.9 Chicago’s homicide count jumped from 480 in 2015 to 762 in
2016; the 2016 homicide rate was the highest in 19 years. 10 Popular explanations for the increase
include: social media driving conflicts among gangs and young people;11 a purported “gang culture”
that leads young people to join gangs and commit violence;12 segregation, poverty and a lack of
effective resources in the poorest communities; 13 and insufficiently harsh punishments for illegal
gun-carrying.14
The country’s attention turned to Chicago when Hadiya Pendleton was shot and killed on
January 29, 2013.15 Only a week earlier, the 15-year-old honors student had performed at President
8
Why is Chicago a Murder Capital? Clues from a Bloody Month, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 29, 2016),
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2016/09/29/why-is-chicago-murder-capital-clues-from-bloody-month.html
[https://perma.cc/JG8R-LXU4].
9

Jeff Asher, U.S. Cities Experienced Another Big Rise In Murder In 2016, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/u-s-cities-experienced-another-big-rise-in-murder-in-2016/ [https://perma.cc/L6WW3ZAL].
10
Azadeh Ansari & Rosa Flores, Chicago’s 762 Homicides in 2016 is Highest in 19 Years, CNN (Jan. 2,
2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/01/us/chicago-murders-2016/index.html [https://perma.cc/V9RL-HDKZ].
11

Carol Marin & Don Moseley, Social Media Helping Fuel Gang Killings, NBC 5 CHI. (Mar. 15, 2017),
http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/social-media-helping-fuel-gang-killings-416286533.html
[https://perma.cc/BHW5-GGC4].
12
Tanveer Ali, Though Chicago Murders Are Down, ‘Gang Culture’ Remains an Issue: Top Cop, DNA INFO
(Dec. 29, 2014), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20141229/chicago/though-chicago-murders-are-down-gang-cultureremains-issue-top-cop [https://perma.cc/WTU5-AX78].
13

Arthur J. Lurigio & Sidney H. Weissman, When it Comes to Battling Gun Violence, These Little Things
Can Make a Big Difference, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (May 24, 2017), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/
20170524/OPINION/170529987/when-it-comes-to-battling-gun-violence-these-little-things-can-make-a-big-difference
[https://perma.cc/57UJ-9KPB].
14

Garry McCarthy, Cops Know Gun Penalties Work, CHI. SUN TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/chicago-sun-times/20130215/281749856753584 [https://perma.cc/MJ2G-HRNA].
15
Hadiya Pendleton Shooting Death: Chicago Teen’s Slaying Strikes a Chord Nationwide, HUFFINGTON
POST (Jan. 30, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/30/hadiya-pendleton-shooting-death_n_2585204.html
[https://perma.cc/NJ8X-KWBK].
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Obama’s inauguration.16 Michelle Obama flew to Chicago to attend Hadiya’s funeral on February
9th, and President Obama invited her parents to attend the State of the Union address three days
later.17
Later that month, HB2265 and SB2267 were introduced in the Illinois House and Senate. 18
The bills imposed a mandatory minimum penalty of three years for most gun-carrying crimes and
required individuals convicted of these offenses to serve at least 85% of their sentence. 19
Chicago political leaders mobilized in support of the bill. At a press conference, Mayor
Rahm Emanuel called for “stiff penalties for gun crimes,” stating, “we need to make sure that once
the crime is committed, not allowing [sic] those individuals [who carry illegal guns] back on the
streets.”20 Chicago police chief Garry McCarthy published an editorial supporting 3-year mandatory
minimum penalties for illegal gun possession, writing, “It is an inescapable fact that if the proposed
three-year mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) had
been in effect last January, the individual responsible for Hadiya’s death would have been in jail
and Hadiya would be alive.”21 Micheail Ward, the then-18-year-old who confessed to shooting
Hadiya, had been on probation for illegal gun possession at the time of the shooting. 22
Crime policy researchers from the University of Chicago joined the debate, speaking in
favor of harsher punishments for gun-carrying. Harold Pollack, co-director of the University of
Chicago Crime Lab, testified before the Illinois House Judiciary Committee in March 2013. 23 He
16
Gary Younge, Michelle Obama Attending Chicago Funeral of Hadiya Pendelton, 15, THE GUARDIAN
(Feb.
9,
2013),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/feb/09/michelle-obama-hadiya-pendelton-funeral
[https://perma.cc/RDR8-ABY9].
17

Darryl Holliday et al., Obama State of the Union: Hadiya’s Parents ‘Deserve a Vote’ on Gun Control,
DNA INFO (Feb. 12, 2013), https://www.dnainfo.com/chicago/20130212/kenwood/obama-state-of-union-hadiyapendletons-parents-national-spotlight [https://perma.cc/5XDV-2SRU].
18

Bill Status of HB2265, ILL. GEN. ASSEMB., http://ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=
2265&GAID=12&GA=98&DocTypeID=HB&LegID=74043&SessionID=85#actions; Bill Status of SB2267, ILL. GEN.
ASSEMB., http://ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocTypeID=SB&DocNum=2267&GAID=12&SessionID=85&LegID=
73859#actions.
19

Id.

20

Edward McClelland, Emanuel Calls for Longer Gun Possession Sentences, NBC 5 CHI. (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Emanuel-Calls-For-Longer-Gun-Possession-Sentences-190707821.html
[https://perma.cc/M6ZX-R7TP].
21
Garry McCarthy, Cops Know Gun Penalties Work, CHI. SUN TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013),
https://www.pressreader.com/usa/chicago-sun-times/20130215/281749856753584 [https://perma.cc/MJ2G-HRNA].
22
Jason Meisner, Alleged Gunman in Hadiya Pendleton Slaying Was on Probation for Weapons Conviction,
CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 12, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-12/news/ct-met-hadiya-pendleton-probation20130212_1_probation-violations-probation-department-weapons-conviction [https://perma.cc/34JE-M4S4].
23

John Maki, Executive Director of the John Howard Association, described the dynamic at the hearing as
follows: “I was there in my role as executive director of JHA, telling legislators the same thing I am saying now: The research
and the evidence say this will not work, and if this bill passes, it will create significant unintended consequences and cost
taxpayers up to $1 billion dollars. . . . The bill’s sponsor then told the committee that he brought the University of Chicago
Crime Lab to rebut my claims. Significantly, while the Crime Lab’s Co-Director supported the bill, he didn’t have any
research or cost-estimates to explain his support. But that didn’t matter. In these kinds of political debates, what really
matters is not the reasoning behind your argument, but who you are and where you come from.” Eric Zorn, Reasonable
Doubt About Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2013), http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/
news_columnists_ezorn/2013/10/mandatory_minimums.html [https://perma.cc/3XT5-3D3X].
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stated, “ . . . illegal gun-carrying is not consistently met with the swift, certain, or serious sanctions
we need to impose. Strengthening penalties for gun crimes is thus a promising strategy for deterring
illegal gun-carrying. . . .”24 Pollack concluded that punishments for gun-carrying needed to be both
more certain and more severe to successfully decrease gun violence. He also reminded legislators
that Hadiya Pendleton’s accused killer had recently been arrested for gun possession. 25
The proposed bills were met with a cautionary prediction from the State’s sentencing
policy advisory body, the Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council (SPAC). 26 Their analysis
estimated that the bill would cause 6,083 additional people to be imprisoned annually, costing
approximately $130 million per year. 27
Jens Ludwig, Director of the University of Chicago Crime Lab, published a memorandum
on October 7, 2013 to argue for the benefits of the proposed bill.28 Using a cost-benefit analysis, he
claimed that the unique dangerousness of people who illegally carry guns makes it especially
valuable to imprison them for longer periods of time. Ludwig calculated that HB 2265 would deliver
a five-to-one return on investment and prevent 400 serious violent crimes annually. Eight days later,
he published an editorial in the Chicago Tribune explaining his findings. He presented the proposed
law as a clear and certain boon to Chicagoans:
The University of Chicago Crime Lab, which I direct, analyzed data on people
placed on probation for illegally carrying a gun in Cook County. These are the
people who would wind up in prison under the proposed law. Our research finds
that at least 3,800 crimes, including more than 400 serious violent crimes, would
be prevented each year in Illinois because the people who would commit those
crimes would be in prison. 29
Ludwig stated no assumptions and cited no other research, except to say that, “A growing
body of research suggests that increased certainty of punishment deters crime, including gun
crime.”30 To the extent that he admitted uncertainty, he allowed only that he may have
underestimated the benefits of the new law. 31
Numerous law professors, social scientists, and policy experts responded to object to
24

TESTIMONY
OF
HAROLD
POLLACK,
U.
CHI.
CRIME
LAB
(Mar.
13,
2013),
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/files/mandatory-minimums-testimony20130313.pdf [https://perma.cc/E93Q-6CPA].
25

Id.

26

The Illinois Sentencing Policy Advisory Council, which reports to the Governor and the General Assembly,
was created in 2009 to review criminal sentencing policies and practices. GINO DIVITO ET AL., AMENDED 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT,
ILL.
SENT’G
POL’Ý
ADVISORY
COUNCIL
(2010),
https://spac.icjia-api.cloud/uploads/
2010%20SPAC%20Annual%20Report-20191106T17590649.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9WJ-2G49].
27

ILL. SENT’G POL’Y ADVISORY COUNCIL, HB2265/SB22671 SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS FOR UNLAWFUL
USE OF A WEAPON (UUW) OFFENSES (2013), http://www.icjia.org/spac/pdf/HB2265_SB2267_SPAC_Analysis.pdf; see
generally LUDWIG, supra note 6.
28

LUDWIG, supra note 6.

29

Jens Ludwig, The Real Costs of Gun Crimes, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 15, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/
2013-10-15/opinion/ct-perspec-1015-violence-20131015_1_gun-crimes-gun-violence-proposed-law
[https://perma.cc/N53R-X6JE].
30

Id.

31

Id.
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Ludwig’s analysis. Criminologist and law professor Franklin Zimring responded the next day with
an editorial in the Chicago Sun Times. Among other points, Zimring argued that Ludwig largely
relied on studies that did not analyze sentence enhancements but considered other interventions
instead.32 In other words, Zimring argued that Ludwig relied on analogies from research on different
kinds of programs instead of considering the substantial sentence enhancement research that already
existed.33 Separately, 32 Chicago-area academics in law and social science signed on to a paper
opposing Ludwig’s conclusions. 34 Their paper reviewed the pertinent literature and found no
evidence that mandatory minimum sentences or sentence enhancements are effective in decreasing
violence.35 It also addressed the “noticeable and devastating” impact of mass incarceration: the
intensive, geographically concentrated use of imprisonment within communities, especially black,
poor communities.36
In a lengthy exchange recorded on a Chicago Tribune blog post, Ludwig responded that
the empirical research cited by his opponents was “not very good.”37 He also rested on his
incapacitation argument, saying that the sheer value of keeping dangerous people locked up justified
the economic costs.38 Finally, Ludwig defended his role as a neutral evaluator of criminal legal
system policy. Ludwig wrote, “ . . . as I have emphasized before neither I nor the Crime Lab is
taking an official stand about this or any other piece of legislation, so much as just trying to provide
people with the best possible social science findings to help inform their assessments of the bill.”39
Ludwig claimed a position as neutral party and authority in the debate.
Other participants in the public debate challenged Ludwig’s self-assessment. John Maki,
Executive Director of the John Howard Association (an Illinois prison monitoring and criminal
justice reform organization) wrote, “I don’t think that accurately describes the role [Ludwig] or his
organization is playing in this debate, which is one of the primary pieces of a public relations
campaign designed to pass a symbolic tough-on-crime bill. . . .”40 Maki argued that Ludwig and his
Crime Lab team must have understood how important their analysis and endorsement was to the
political case for higher gun sentences.
A few months later, in January 2014, SPAC weighed in by publishing a “Trends Analysis”
analyzing whether increases in penalties for illegal gun-carrying were associated with decreases in
violent crime. The report noted that Illinois gun sentences were increased five times between 2000
and 2012.41 Comparing Chicago to other cities, the authors found no evidence that increased
32

Franklin Zimring, False Premises of Gun Sentences, CHI. SUN-TIMES (Oct. 16, 2013).

33

Id.

34
STEPHANIE KOLLMANN & DOMINIQUE D. NONG, COMBATING GUN VIOLENCE IN ILLINOIS: EVIDENCEBASED SOLUTIONS, NW. L. BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC (2013), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=3&article=1000&context=jclc_symposium&type=additional
[https://perma.cc/W3D7JN22].
35

Id. at 2–3.

36

Id. at 12.

37

Eric Zorn, Reasonable Doubt About Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. at 33 (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2013/10/mandatory_minimums.html
[https://perma.cc/3XT53D3X].
38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

ILL. SENT’G POL’Y ADVISORY COUNCIL, TRENDS ANALYSIS: UNLAWFUL USE OF A WEAPON 2 (2014),
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penalties for gun-carrying reduced violent crime. 42
Ludwig and the Crime Lab stood alone among researchers and academics in supporting
gun sentence enhancements. Others contested the costs and benefits Ludwig ascribed to the policy
and emphasized the other frames in which the policy could be considered, including its contribution
to mass incarceration. But despite the countervailing evidence, Chicago political leaders including
the mayor continued to push for sentence enhancements as a violence reduction strategy. 43 Ludwig’s
estimate matters because it legitimated a political push for an imprisonment-based strategy,
allowing the Mayor’s Office to claim research-based support for its preferred policy.
II. IS INCAPACITATION “MECHANICAL?”

When 6,000 additional people are imprisoned due to a new policy, the results will be
difficult to predict. Social science provides some tools to model the effects of this sudden disruption.
If the motivators of gun-carrying are primarily structural, driven by local social and economic
contexts, then imprisoning people who carry guns will do little to reduce rates of gun-carrying, and
therefore, violence. If instead, gun carriers are the bad apples that spoil the bunch, then imprisoning
them should substantially reduce gun-carrying, both by incapacitating the gun carriers and
discouraging others from following their examples.
Ludwig’s methodology compares the cost of imprisonment to the estimated financial
benefits of prospectively prevented crimes. Ludwig takes for granted that the key cost of
imprisonment is the money spent by the State to imprison, and that the key benefits should be
measured by surveying people about their hypothetical willingness to pay to prevent crimes. 44 By
adopting this methodology, he accepts that it is better to imprison thirteen people for a year each (at
a cost of $280,800) than for one robbery to be committed (at a “social cost” of $287,000).
Of course, this is not the only way to analyze the merits of a proposed policy. In this
section, I continue to analyze and engage with the core claims of Ludwig’s estimate, while using
diverse sources to challenge Ludwig’s hypothesis and argue that mass imprisonment of gun-carriers
will lead to new sources of violence.
In this section, I first directly challenge Ludwig’s evidence for the impact of sentence
enhancements. Second, I argue that incapacitation is not as effective as Ludwig predicts. Third and
fourth, I draw on diverse social-scientific research to consider the problem of “substitution
violence”: the many ways in which the vacuum left by 6,000 imprisoned people might increase
violence in neighborhoods. I present both a “status tournament” theory and a “gang disruption”
theory for how this substitution may occur. Fifth, I argue for the criminogenic effects of
imprisonment, especially in the medium-to-long-terms. Finally, I reflect briefly on the political
qualities of Ludwig’s estimate.

https://spac.icjia-api.cloud/uploads/SPAC_Trends_Analysis_Report_09_2014-20191127T15204111.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KZG5-U44Y].
42

Id. at 14.

43

Emanuel’s Gun-possession Gambit Could Be Costly Mistake, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Sept. 27, 2014),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140927/ISSUE07/309279988/emanuels-bargain-on-gun-possession-sentencingcould-prove-to-be-a (describing Emanuel’s continued push for longer gun sentences) [https://perma.cc/67BL-PLR9].
44

LUDWIG, supra note 6, at 4 n.15.
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A. Weaknesses in Ludwig’s Case for Sentence Enhancements

There are important strengths to Ludwig’s hypothesis. He makes smart use of wellestablished facts and theories about gun violence. The large majority of Chicago homicides are
committed with handguns, and the large majority of these homicides arise from spontaneous
altercations, not crimes like robbery or premeditated violence. 45 It is believed that, because gun
violence is spontaneous and dispute-based, reducing the number of people who regularly carry guns
is critical to violence-reduction. Ludwig quotes criminologist Lawrence Sherman, who writes, “To
the extent that homicide frequently occurs spontaneously among young men in public places, it is
the carrying of firearms, rather than the ownership, that is the immediate proximate cause of
criminal injury.”46 This analysis suggest that reducing gun-carrying is the key to reducing gun
violence.
Violent crime and gun-carrying are closely linked. The below two maps show rates of
serious violent crime and per capita convictions for illegal gun-carrying across Chicago zip codes:
Figure 1: Gun Convictions Concentrated on West and South Sides

45

LUDWIG, supra note 6, at 1–2.

46

Lawrence Sherman, Gun Carrying and Homicide Prevention, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N. 1193 (2000).
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Figure 2: Serious Violent Crime Concentrated on West and South Sides

As the two maps demonstrate, ZIP codes with the highest rates of serious violence also
have the highest rates of gun convictions. (The methodology for collecting the data to produce both
maps is explained in Section IV). Ludwig is right to identify a close link between gun-carrying and
violent crime. The question is whether sentence enhancements are likely to substantially decrease
gun-carrying.
First, Ludwig attempts to convince the reader that current lengths of imprisonment for gun
carriers are not long enough to deter gun-carrying. Ludwig notes that some people convicted for
illegal gun-carrying receive probation, and that those who are imprisoned serve an average of 0.33
to 1.5 years in Illinois prisons, depending on the specific offense and whether the conviction was
for a first or subsequent offense.47 Many of these individuals are also imprisoned pretrial, so this
estimate does not fully capture the length of their imprisonment.
Ludwig attempts to prove his point that longer sentences lead to more deterrence through
a discussion of Project HOPE. Project HOPE was an experiment in Hawaii about reducing
probationer recidivism. The theory behind Project HOPE was that punishment for probationers was
too unreliable: probationers were rarely punished for violating the conditions of probation, but when

47

LUDWIG, supra note 6, at 3.
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they were, the punishment could be severe, up to months or years in prison.48 Project HOPE used
swift, certain and very short (a few days or weeks in jail) punishments for probation violation. 49 The
experiment was effective: probationers assigned to HOPE were significantly less likely to have their
probation revoked.50
However, Project HOPE did not prove anything about the effect of longer sentences. A
very small, rapidly delivered, and certain punishment was all that was needed. Ludwig tries to link
the two by saying that Chicago gun punishments are variable and inconsistent. 51 But the analogy
fails. The Project HOPE researchers wrote: “All too often probation practices effectively allow
hard-drug-abusing criminals to continue using drugs with impunity . . . sanctions are too rare and
too delayed. When sanctions are imposed, they tend to be too severe (months, or occasionally years,
in prison.)”52 As the researchers go on to explain, Project HOPE is an experiment about how, so
long as punishments are consistently given, they can be extremely effective even if they are quite
minor. The results suggest that shorter sentences are just as good, if they are consistently applied.
Unlike the Hawaii drug probationers who committed violations but avoided punishment,
all Chicagoans convicted of illegally carrying guns are punished. Almost all spend time in jail
awaiting bond hearings, plea bargaining, or trial. As Ludwig describes in his own memorandum,
75% of illegal gun-possession defendants are imprisoned and 14% receive probation.53 A few
receive lighter punishments—four percent are sentenced only to community service—but no one
who is convicted for illegal gun possession escapes punishment. And sentence enhancements do
not increase the likelihood of punishment. Sentence enhancements are only an investment in
imprisoning individuals, not finding and prosecuting gun carriers. Ludwig concludes this section
by writing, “Any measure capable of reducing [variability in gun sentences] and increasing the
consistency or certainty of sanctions would be expected to help reduce gun-carrying through
deterrence.”54 But he rests on weak foundations, because the proposed bill does nothing to increase
the certainty of sanctions.
Ludwig relies on just a few other pieces of research to build his case. These include studies
from 1977 and 1980 of a Massachusetts mandatory minimum law, and a 2003 study of anti-gun
police patrols.55 The limited empirical support Ludwig is able to muster speaks to the absence of
good social science supporting the efficacy of sentence enhancements, and to the weakness of his
deterrence arguments.
B. Research Does Not Support Incapacitation as Crime Control

In 1995, John DiIulio coined what he called Wattenberg’s Law: “A thug who’s in prison

48
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can’t shoot your sister.” 56 Almost twenty years later, then-Police Superintendent Garry McCarthy
used the same logic: if only we punished gun sentences more harshly, Hadiya Pendleton would be
alive today.57 To some, it is obvious that imprisoning people who have acted violently will keep
communities safer. But despite its appeal, incapacitation-based approaches to violence reduction
are not well-supported in the literature.
Ludwig argues that even if there is no deterrence effect of sentence enhancements, the
incapacitation benefits alone make the proposed law a clear win. Ludwig analyzes data on 340
Chicagoans convicted of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and sentenced to probation. He finds
that many of the individuals in the group were arrested for serious crimes within one year of their
probation sentence, including three murders, one criminal sexual assault, fifteen aggravated assaults
and six robberies.58 He calculates the social cost of this recidivism to be $39.3 million, 59 or $115,602
per probationer. This “social cost” is more than five times the $21,600 incremental cost per personyear of imprisonment. From an economic standpoint, Ludwig argues, imprisoning gun carriers is
an incredible bargain.
Ludwig assumes that if the gun probationers had been imprisoned, crime would decrease
in their communities by at least the number of crimes they “would have” committed on probation.
He refers to these benefits as mechanical, like a natural law. “Incapacitation is the mechanical crimereducing effect that arises because people in detention are physically prevented from committing
crimes against the general public,” Ludwig writes.60 Certainly, imprisoned people are rarely able to
commit crimes against people who are not imprisoned. But Ludwig cites no studies establishing
incapacitation as a “mechanical,” certain force in the world. When a person is imprisoned, the
outside world does not continue as it would have with that person in it. Instead, a vacuum is created
where that person would have been. And, as studies of imprisonment do not suggest that sentence
enhancements effectively reduce crime, there is reason to believe that the vacuum does not remain
unfilled.
Although Ludwig describes the effect of incapacitation as “mechanical”—akin to DiIulio’s
“thug in prison” theory of crime prevention—the range of possibilities is much greater than he
admits. Consider, for example, that people who shoot people are also at increased risk of being
shot.61 If gun carriers both commit shootings and provoke them, then locking up a gun carrier will
reduce crime by more than just the crimes he would have committed. On the other hand, imagine
that a convicted gun carrier is a member of a gang and the gang recruits a new member because of
his conviction. As part of the recruitment process, they thrust the new member into conflicts with
56
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neighboring gangs to test his mettle and judgment. In this situation, incapacitation may lead to more
violent crimes being committed.
The above examples have nothing to do with deterrence. Neither involve a person making
a judgment about whether to commit a crime based on the risk of punishment. Instead, both
situations consider how a person’s imprisonment might affect crime in their community. There is
no reason to assume that the “real effect” of incapacitation is equal to the number of crimes that the
prisoner “would have” committed. There are many other variables at play.
In the 1970’s, academics like James Q. Wilson argued that prison sentences were too short
and too inconsistently imposed to capture the full benefits of keeping criminals off the streets. 62 At
the time, criminal sentences were significantly less severe than they are today. People with felony
records convicted of robbery sometimes avoided prison altogether, and parole was frequently
granted.63
Two major efforts to estimate the effect of imprisonment on crime suggested that
incarceration was effective in reducing crime. In two separate studies, Steven Levitt and William
Spelman analyzed state prison population data and index crime rates and found that incarceration
had a crime reduction effect of about -0.4. According to their estimates, increasing the incarceration
rate by one percent decreases index crime by 0.4 percent. 64 But Levitt and Spelman reached this
result by inventing an “adjustment” to the calculated rate. They assumed that the crime reduction
effect is masked, because in addition to increased incarceration reducing crime, increased crime
also increases incarceration.65
Bruce Western has challenged Levitt and Spelman’s findings, noting that several other
researchers have found a crime reduction ratio closer to -0.1, far smaller than Levitt and Spelman’s
estimates.66 Western argues that Levitt’s crime reduction adjustment is unrealistic because it
assumes that rising crime is a primary cause of increases in incarceration. If most of the growth in
incarceration occurs for reasons other than increases in the crime rate, then Levitt’s assumption that
growing crime rates cause increased incarceration is weakened. 67 Western’s book argues that after
1980, increases in the use of prison, the length of sentences, and the rates of parole revocation were
primarily responsible for the US incarceration boom. 68 Rising crime rates, in contrast, are not
closely associated with increases in incarceration. 69 Western concludes that even if the prison
population had remained constant, about nine-tenths of the 1990’s drop in serious crime still would
62
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have occurred, an estimate that is in line with many other estimates of the prison-crime connection.70
There are other reasons to be skeptical that incarceration is very effective in reducing
crime. Some researchers are skeptical that any strong association has been proven. Bert Useem, et
al. write:
We lack confidence in existing efforts for several reasons. The key one is the lack
of robustness of the regression results. If indeed there were a deep, causal
association between prison population and crime rates, minor changes in
specification or the years covered would alter only slightly the results. In
conducting our own analyses, we did not find this. The significance levels
changed, and even the signs reversed, depending on the time period covered,
control variables included, and the estimating techniques used.71
Other researchers have also noted that the effect of incapacitation has not been wellsupported. Phillip Cook and Jens Ludwig wrote in 2010, “While the incapacitation effect is easy to
grasp, it is not the same as the net reduction in crime stemming from locking up a particular
individual . . . Replacement may also be found in other gang- and group- oriented crimes . . . The
evidence on this issue is mixed at best.”72 Despite the appeal of incapacitation as a justification for
sentence enhancements, the extent of its effectiveness in reducing crime is unproven.
As early as 1994, James Q. Wilson reversed his position on the need for enhanced
sentences, stating that doubling the prison population would do little to reduce crime. 73 Other
research runs the gamut from strongly supportive to deeply skeptical of incapacitation. But one
thing is clear: there is no definitive measure of the strength of incapacitation-related crime
reduction, and a straightforward, “mechanical” effect has not been proven. Although Ludwig
attempts to base his cost-benefit analysis on incapacitation, the assumption that incapacitation
substantially reduces crime is neither neutral nor well-supported.
C. Status Tournaments and Gun Violence

Bill had his close shaves. At the court, he was always running his mouth, dunking
on the underregulation rim, then bellowing and beating his chest. One local
soldier got tired of the talk, went to the car, and came back swinging an aluminum
bat through air. But Bill was cool. He knew that at any moment, he could reach
into his dip and unveil the last word.74
In THE BEAUTIFUL STRUGGLE, Ta-Nehisi Coates describes his brother Bill’s experiences
as a gun carrier. Bill starts carrying after getting beat up by a group of kids from another Baltimore
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neighborhood.75 He then realizes that gun-carrying allows him to start conflicts he might have
otherwise avoided. One night, drinking with friends at college, Bill’s friend David calls his
girlfriend and a man answers the phone, enraging David. Bill encourages David to escalate the
confrontation, and the group drives over to avenge David’s honor. 76 They find that the man is bigger
and stronger than any of them, but Bill doesn’t back down. 77 Ultimately, Bill ends the conflict by
shooting his gun in the air and narrowly escapes apprehension by a campus security officer. The
next day, hiding out at his sister’s house, Bill learns that David’s “girlfriend” was not even dating
him. David had talked up a relationship that did not exist. 78
Bill was able to claim a tough identity because he was ready to use lethal violence to protect
himself. Knowing that he could effectively repel attacks allowed him to freely escalate conflicts. A
gun may be a tool of dominance, allowing young people to freely antagonize others and resist status
attacks. In other situations, a gun may support a last desperate effort to protect against beatings and
humiliation. One 12-year-old Chicago Public Schools student was caught bringing a gun to school
in response to bullying. 79 The student was fighting to survive, not to dominate.
If gun-carrying can be explained in part by status concerns, we can begin to think of gun
carriers as occupying a distinct position within some social hierarchies. Those who carry guns will
be able to display toughness by antagonizing others and standing up for themselves, knowing that
they can deter physical attacks. Gun-carrying may be most valuable for people who harass and
attack others and for people who are particularly susceptible to attack and harassment.
This introduction brings into view a “status tournament” theory of gun violence. The status
tournament theory can explain why sentence enhancements for gun possession will not substantially
reduce violent crime. When a gun carrier is taken off the street, it provides two incentives for others
to obtain firearms and compete in the status tournament.
First, gun-carrying may be more valuable when fewer people on the street have guns. A
decrease in rates of gun-carrying increases the value of having a gun in status confrontations. 80
Status tournament-involved individuals will obtain guns or carry guns more frequently when the
value of doing so increases, and as Ludwig’s memo argues, increased gun-carrying leads to
increased violence.
Second, increased imprisonment may create vacuums in the status hierarchy. Instead of
competitors automatically being “promoted” when a person leaves the tournament, we might think
75
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of them as competing for the new position, as middle-managers might apply for a junior executive
position that opens up. If there is strength in numbers, a powerful group may seek to sustain its
strength. Young men who are starting out in the tournament may need at least one or two
companions: if their close friends are incarcerated, they may seek replacements who would not have
otherwise considered carrying guns. Similarly, if a high-status gun carrier is incarcerated, others
may compete to take his spot. Network disruptions may increase jockeying for status, causing
additional violence. One need not imagine a rigid hierarchy for this theory to hold; the status
hierarchy might be local, contested, understood in different ways, and unknown to most people.
Increases in violence following gun carrier incarceration can be explained by two related
concepts: stability and churn. Stability refers to the network of relationships that exists in a
community at any given time. Research shows that neighbors understand the social positions of
people in their networks: who leads a social group or a gang, who is influential, who is a wanna-be.
One study asked local residents, gang members, and criminal justice system personnel in Chicago
neighborhoods to rank gangs by status, and found that all three groups produced the same
rankings.81 This idea is central to the concept of the “code of the street”: a person can only build a
reputation if others know about it. The removal of a high-status gun carrier may force a
reconfiguration: now that he is gone, who will his friends rely on for support? If he was the toughest
of his friends, who is the toughest now?
Churn refers to the rate at which people enter and exit the status tournament. People age
out of gangs, and younger kids enter them. People leave town, and relationships wax and wane.
Over time, people occupy different identities and roles relative to one another. Increased
imprisonment may accelerate churn. With more vacuums to be filled, more people will enter the
tournament more quickly. New competitors entering the tournament may be more inexperienced,
and perhaps not as knowledgeable about how to push a confrontation to its brink without getting
hurt or killed. This inexperience may increase the rate of violence.82
The imprisonment of a gun carrier might also decrease the motivation of other residents
to carry a gun or “enter” the status tournament. The same people being incarcerated for gun-carrying
might be responsible for the social context that ties status to gun-carrying, and the imprisonment of
these individuals might dramatically change the social context. But even if the motives for guncarrying were weakened in part by incarceration of gun carriers, there still might be associated
“churn,” a reconfiguration and jockeying for status among those still participating in the status
tournament, resulting in increased violence. Additionally, the churn associated with short prison
sentences—the reentry of gun carriers into their communities following imprisonment—might also
create violence-increasing churn. The question is whether the disruptive effect of recruiting new
status competitors is stronger than the disruptive effect of a status competitor reentering the
competition post-imprisonment.
For the status tournament theory to work, it must be shown that gun-carrying and a
willingness to use violence are connected to status, which would explain the instrumental usefulness
of guns. An explanation is also needed for why anyone would choose to carry a gun.83 Although the
81
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usefulness of a gun to avoid victimization is clear, gun-carrying is also likely to result in injury,
death, and imprisonment.
Research on gun-carrying and gun violence suggests that status and hierarchy concerns do
motivate gun violence. Much gun violence is caused by “beef,” interpersonal conflicts and
retaliation for past violence that is not directly connected to instrumental disputes about drugs or
money. Studies of Chicago gang homicide have shown that 97.5% of all gang homicides resulted
from arguments or altercations, not disputes over money, property, or drugs, compared to 67% of
other homicides.84 Additionally, 50-60% of Chicago homicides are gang-related, and these
homicides are increasingly committed between members of smaller, more fractured gangs.85
Additionally, gun carriers have rational motivations for gun-carrying. Wilkinson and
Fagan have described the “scripts” that young people use when deciding how to carry and use guns,
and the reasons they give for gun-carrying.86 These reasons included projecting a “tough” image,
seeking power and dominance, and self-defense and protection.87 For example, some of the young
people interviewed by Wilkinson and Fagan reported that they started carrying a gun after being
victimized.88 All of these are rational motivations for carrying firearms.
The links between violence and status for some boys and men in poor segregated urban
neighborhoods have been extensively documented. Elijah Anderson argues that because poor
carrying, researchers have identified many motivators for crime and gun-carrying among young people, not all of which are
easily classifiable in terms of instrumental rationality. See, e.g., VICTOR RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK
AND LATINO BOYS 102 (2011) (exploring theories that classify crime and “misbehavior” among young people as “resistance
identities,” a practice of “contesting a system that sees them as criminals”); BERNARD HARCOURT, LANGUAGE OF THE GUN
58–59, 94–95 (2006) (Finding after sharing photos of guns with boys in a juvenile jails and conducting open-ended
interviews with them that the boys associated guns with three clusters of meaning: action and protection, commodity and
dislike, and recreation and respect, all of which connect to very different motivators for gun-carrying. Also concluding that
there exist “sensual” elements of guns and gun-carrying, including the feel of the weapon, the tension of holding one in a
situation of conflict, and the exhilaration and thrill of violence.).
84

Andrew Papachristos, Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social Structure of Gang
Homicide, 115 AM. J. SOC. 74, 91–92 (2009). Note that the methodology used by Papachristos to identify noninstrumental
homicide is open to question. Although disrespectful graffiti could be viewed as noninstrumental, gang members might
reasonably believe that they will be attacked or lose drug territory if they do not contest even “symbolic” attacks on their
turf. Compare Andrew Papachristos, Murder by Structure: Dominance Relations and the Social Structure of Gang Homicide,
115 AM. J. SOC. 74, 91 n.19 (2009) (“Turf considerations for a gang are considered instrumental if they relate to drug dealing
or other economic interests and are expressive if the turf violation involves use by a nonmember or noneconomic disputes
(e.g., disrespectful graffiti on turf)”), with ROBERT VARGAS, WOUNDED CITY, 158–59 (2016) (“[I]nterviews with Latin
Kings at Youth Inc. revealed that the absence of 22 Boys on street corners was the factor that spurred violent competition
over the turf . . . Eusebio, a Latin King, described how the disappearance of 22 Boys gang members created the perception
of vulnerability: ‘Soldiers be always going back and forth over blocks and territories. A 22 Boy will spray ‘Latin King Killer’
on one of our blocks, and we’ll go back and spray ‘22 Boy Killer’ to let them know we ain’t gonna take their bullshit. But
after a while, if you don’t protect your turf, then dudes will see that and think you weak. First, we spray graffiti on your
territory, and if you don’t do anything, we take your corner. If you don’t protect your corner, we take your block.’”).
85

Andrew Papachristos & David Kirk, Changing the Street Dynamic: Evaluating Chicago’s Group Violence
Reduction Strategy, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 525, 530, 532 (2015).
86

Deanna Wilkinson & Jeffrey Fagan, The Role of Firearms in Violence “Scripts”: The Dynamics of Gun
Events Among Adolescent Males, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2006).
87

Id.

88

Id. at 84.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss2/1

2020]

THE TRUTH LIMPS AFTER

85

children often have fewer methods of self-expression, they are more likely to form identities through
interpersonal conflict.89 “In this often violent give-and-take, raising oneself up largely relies on
putting someone else down,” writes Anderson. 90 In what Anderson refers to as “staging areas”—
neighborhood hangouts, business districts, or large gathering areas like sports events or movie
theaters—people may dare each other into confrontations, challenging strangers from other
neighborhoods.91 These public places offer a chance to show off to others and build status. Anderson
also mentions that young people who are “campaigning for respect” often bring guns or other
weapons to staging areas to support their bids for status. 92
Other research has affirmed the importance of staging areas. One study found that 74% of
serious gun assaults in Boston occurred across just 5% of the city’s intersections and street
segments.93 This data is consistent with the hypothesis that young people intentionally seek public
spaces to campaign for status and bring firearms when they do so.
A similar connection is described by Fagan and Wilkinson, who characterize a “wild” or
“killer” identity as sitting on top of the “identity hierarchy of the street.” 94 They write, “The
perpetuation of the sense of self and the image in the minds of others also is an instrumental goal
of much weapon use . . . Some subcultures or networks may also reflect norms in which excessive
violence, including weapons use, is valued, gains social rewards, and gives great personal
pleasure.”95 This violence, they clarify, is not “senseless,” but a means to an end.
Robert Garot describes the gang-related practice of walking up to a stranger and asking
“Who you claim?” or “Where you from?”96 The question introduces a powerful uncertainty.
Claiming the wrong gang or neighborhood may lead to a mugging or a beating. Even the “right”
answer—responding with “Nowhere,” or “I don’t bang”—may lead to the same.97 If the respondent
“ranks out” and denies gang membership, he is submitting to the instigator, whose status is thereby
enhanced.98
People who compete for status do not always seek confrontation and will resolve many
conflicts without violent escalation. Garot writes, “One’s face is always on the line in a violent
confrontation. Few can be the ‘baddest’ or the ‘hardest,’ and many would not want to be; such a
stance cannot be sustained indefinitely.” 99 It may be that almost all gun carriers in Chicago would
prefer to never use their weapons, even as status and hierarchy concerns motivate violence.
Additionally, since most gun violence is perpetrated by a small number of individuals, one can
imagine that distinctive, hyperlocal social contexts drive violence without being reducible to a
89
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single paradigm.100 In other words, the above framing is meant to suggest one way of understanding
the drivers of violence, not to occupy the field among those theories.
But how can the rewards for gun-carrying outweigh the risks? The rewards seem modest:
either increased freedom from abuse or popularity. In contrast, the risks are enormous: crippling
injury, death, and imprisonment. Tournament theory offers an explanation for why people accept
high risks in pursuit of a prized position.
Levitt and Venkatesh demonstrate that a low chance at meaningful returns can motivate
participation in dangerous activities. An analysis of a drug-selling gang’s financial records revealed
that street-level “foot soldiers” were paid only slightly more than minimum wage but faced a very
high risk of death: around 7% annually. 101 Many of the foot soldiers also held jobs in the legal
employment sector.102 Although foot soldiers understood the risks of drug dealing and demanded
higher wages at times of conflict,103 the rewards were modest in light of the risks.
To explain the seemingly irrational choices of foot soldiers, Levitt and Venkatesh invoke
the idea of a tournament. A quote from a foot soldier illustrates this framing: “You think I wanta be
selling drugs on the street my whole life? No way . . . people don’t last long doing this shit. So, you
know, I figure I got a chance to move up.” 104 Levitt and Venkatesh note that gang leaders earn
substantially more than foot soldiers, and serving as a foot soldier offers a chance at advancement.105
The authors note the possibility that acts of heroism or intelligent risk-taking during periods of gang
warfare may increase the odds of promotion. 106 This model may be efficient from the perspective
of leaders, who seek to identify the best talent and promote it.107
The rewards of winning in the status tournament may include respect, esteem, sex, or
financial rewards. For some, they may be connected to shedding a victim or punk status and
avoiding victimization. Improving one’s ranking at any level, whether from a victim to a weak but
resilient fighter, or from tough to very tough, may have benefits. There is also the motivation to
make “something out of nothing” or to “get from here to there” by claiming the power to “transcend
limitations and ridicule through incontrovertible dangerousness.” 108 Victories in the status
tournament may allow young people to establish an identity when other paths to success are
denied.109
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In considering this hierarchy, we must remember that some youth do not compete for status
through aggression, while others may flit in and out of the competition, trying on and abandoning
different identities over time. Garot describes a young man, Angel, who was confronted by a past
antagonist from a rival gang while on a date at the movies. The antagonist picked a fight, but Angel
disavowed his affiliation with his gang. When the rival continued to provoke him, Angel left to go
to a different movie theater. Angel used the logic of not wanting to ruin a date night by fighting,
and his girlfriend affirmed his decision, saying, “They know you ain’t no punk. They know if you
want to, you can whoop his ass.”110 As Garot describes the situation, Angel’s “skillful interactional
moves left his honor intact.”111 Angel may be concerned with maintaining his reputation, but in
these circumstances, he was unwilling to escalate conflicts using violence or the threat of it. Other
young people may be respected even though they stick to their own business and do not present a
tough identity.112 The status tournament is not the only way of winning respect or succeeding, and
it does not describe a simple binary in which one is clearly in or out.
In summary, the status tournament theory allows us to imagine a diverse group of
participants while capturing the insights of the tournament model. It allows us to envision different
competitors, from people trying to rise in the status hierarchy to picked-on kids who just want to
stop being a victim. Finally, it clarifies that violence substitution may arise both from new
competitors entering the tournament and from current competitors intensifying their efforts.
D. Disruption: Gang Recruitment and Shifting Gang Identities

When imprisoned gun carriers are gang members or gang leaders, their removal may cause
new violent crime in a variety of ways. Robert Vargas describes the need for theories that capture
the consequences of gang-member imprisonment, such as gang wars over territory when a newly
leaderless gang is too disorganized to defend its turf.113 The examples below show these processes
in action.
Over time, gangs fade away and new gangs form. This process is accelerated when a gang
loses strength because its members are in prison. Consider this account from Rob, a sixteen-yearold gang member in Los Angeles:
There was the Rippers [old gang’s name], but so many of their members went to
jail that there really wasn’t enough leadership people around. So a number of
people decided to start a new gang. So then we went around the area to check
who wanted to be in the gang. We only checked out those we really wanted. It
was like pro football scouts. . . .114
Notice Rob’s description of the motivations for creating a new gang: because the existing
gang had diminished in numbers, Rob and his friends felt it was possible to recruit a new gang in
the same area. He may be boasting about his stature and abilities as a talent-seeker and recruiter,
110
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but there is no reason to doubt that he really was motivated by the imprisonment of many of the
members of the old neighborhood gang.
Additionally, the displacement of a gang or gang leader may cause new conflict between
other gangs. Consider this account from Juliana, a resident of the Little Village neighborhood in
Chicago, describing the effects of the gang violence spurred by the arrest of a local gang leader:
Yeah, after they arrested the chief [Rudy Cantu, leader of the 22 Boys], Latin
Kings started coming from the other side to fight these guys [the Satan Disciples].
Thankfully when the shooting took place here on the corner my house didn’t get
hit, but now I don’t let my kids out the house anymore. 115
Juliana believed that the increase in violence between neighboring gangs was attributable
to the disruption in local gang leadership.
Evidence on violence networks suggests that replacement and substitution will occur as
gang members are incarcerated and killed. A person’s risk of being a perpetrator or victim of
homicide is highly dependent on his or her position in a network. 116 Papachristos writes, “ . . . the
observed patterns of murderous interactions are rather stable over time, even though individual gang
members (most notably the victim) come and go.” 117 If substitutes come to fill gaps when gang
members are murdered, we should expect similar substitutions when gang members are
incarcerated.
Gangs may test the qualities of new recruits, who must be willing to put their bodies on
the line for other gang members, but also must use discretion in exercising force. One gang leader
described how this evaluation process led him to deny full membership to a recruit: “There’s lots
of things we liked about Rider . . . but he’s just too crazy. You just couldn’t tell what he’d do. If we
kept him, he’d have the police on us all the time. He just had to go.”118 The gang leader had tested
the recruit’s ability to use violence effectively and found him too unreliable to become a regular
member of the gang.
Sentence enhancements may increase the rate of gang replacement. Albert J. Reiss, Jr.
suggests that longer sentences may increase the likelihood that gang members will seek
replacements: if the gang expects that the imprisoned member will be gone for a long time, they
will be more eager to find a replacement. 119 Greater substitution rates may lead to a net increase in
gang-involved individuals; consider that the imprisoned member may rejoin the gang upon reentry.
Fighting can be used as an initiation ritual in gangs, from jumping in to staged fights. 120 A
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prospective member may be required to commit a crime in the presence of gang members. 121 These
crimes may lead to fatal violence. Sociologist Jack Katz writes, “We know that proving whether
one is in the gang or not is often a motivating factor in such characteristic forms of gang violence
as drive-by shootings.”122 Micheail Ward, the young man who shot and killed Hadiya Pendleton,
said in an interrogation that he only shot Pendleton because he was under pressure from an older,
higher-ranking gang member who threatened to kill him if he didn’t pull the trigger. 123
Gangs are concerned with recruiting the right people. Above, Rob described the need to
“scout” for members, who should be tough and intelligent. This matches Anderson’s account of the
need for a loyal group in Code of the Street: “Part of what protects a person is both how many
people can be counted on to avenge his honor if he is rolled on in a fight and who these defenders
are—that is, what their status on the street is.”124 Gang leaders must sift through a number of
potential recruits to determine who will be a good fit. 125 If a gang’s numbers dwindle, it will need
to recruit new members to remain powerful.
Gang member imprisonment may increase violence in other ways. New gang members,
who must prove that they can use violence when needed, may be less skilled at pushing conflict to
the brink without getting hurt or hurting others. Older gang members may be more skilled at
avoiding unnecessary conflict. Additionally, removal of a high-status gang member may spur
internal competition, resulting in the gang splintering into multiple factions or causing violence
between gang members.126
Studying Chicago’s Little Village neighborhood, Robert Vargas found that the arrest of a
gang leader led to a short-term spike in violence. While violence levels eventually regressed to the
pre-arrest levels, the increase was statistically significant in the month following the arrest.127
Describing the effect, he wrote, “an intervention aimed at dismantling a drug cartel could have
unintended adverse effects by, for example, sparking violent competition among rival drug cartels
over the market share of the cartel dismantled by law enforcement.” 128 His theory focuses on how
gangs respond to the removal of a neighboring gang’s leader.
Vargas’s theory suggests that violence substitution is most likely to occur when there are
adjacent gangs that might claim the turf of the newly leaderless gang. 129 Larger gangs are more
likely to act aggressively and engage in turf-claiming.130 Through interviews, Vargas found that
121
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neighborhood residents attributed the spike in violence to the removal of the neighborhood gang’s
leader.131 Vargas also noted the presence of signs of aggression from the neighboring Latin Kings
gang, including spraying graffiti with Latin Kings iconography deep in the smaller gang’s
territory.132 These findings mirror an observation from Murder by Structure that gangs with more
turf overlap are more likely to murder one another’s members. 133
None of the above suggests that gangs should not be disrupted. However, there are many
reasons to doubt that increased incarceration will mechanically result in reduced violence. There
are too many potential counter-factors to take such an impact for granted.
E. The Criminogenic Effects of Imprisonment

It is well documented that incarceration deprives families of resources, 134 increases
behavioral problems among children of incarcerated parents (and presumably harms them in the
longer term),135 and marks the former prisoner as less valuable in economic and social terms,
decreasing their prospects for employment and stability. 136 Studies using time lag analysis to
estimate the longer-term impact of incarceration on crime suggest that short-term reductions in
crime may be balanced or outweighed over time. These individual, family, and community-level
impacts on violent crime must be considered to give a full reckoning of the effects of incarceration.
First, the costs of incarceration weigh heavily on families and may exacerbate conditions
associated with crime. A 14-state survey of the impact of incarceration on families found that two
in three family members had difficulty meeting basic needs because of their loved one’s
incarceration, and almost 20% could not afford housing due to the resultant loss in income. 137 These
costs include prison visits, phone calls, commissary money, and criminal legal debt. A 1998 study
of women visiting male prisoners found that the average monthly cost of visits, phone calls, and
mailing packages was $292.138 In addition to the harms to families, this resource-drain decreases
the financial capabilities of neighborhoods and communities. The costs of incarceration to families
reduce available income and greatly increase the stresses of providing for a family, the same kinds
of pressure associated with higher rates of crime. 139
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Second, the negative effects of parental incarceration on children may drive criminogenic
social conditions over time. Imprisoned men are as likely to have children as men who are not
imprisoned.140 And parental imprisonment is increasingly common for children: 25.1% of black
children and 3.6% of white children born in 1990 had experienced paternal incarceration by age 14,
compared to 13.8% of black children and 2.2% of white children born in 1978. 141 Family
imprisonment weakens ties between parents and children and is associated with increased
behavioral problems in children. Specifically, Wakefield and Wildeman find that paternal
incarceration is associated with substantial and statistically significant increases in a range of
behavioral problems, including aggression (a more common response among young boys) and
internalizing problems (a more common response among young girls). 142 These harms are not
limited to childhood, but extend throughout children’s lives. Wildeman and Wakefield summarize
the impact: “The resulting harm is likely to include several other critical domains of adjustment—
school success, occupational attainment, and family formation, to name a few—because childhood
mental health and behavioral problems tend to accumulate and spread over time.” 143 In addition to
the individualized harms, these effects exacerbate societal inequities between white and black
families, due to high rates of parental imprisonment among black children. 144
Third, imprisonment marks a person and decreases their social and economic prospects
after release, harming their lives and the lives of people in their networks. The impact of
incarceration can be dramatic. A regression analysis of wage mobility among young men found that
incarceration produced a wage penalty of seven to nineteen percent, after controlling for age,
incarceration status, work experience, schooling, standardized test scores, drug use, and marital
status.145 A Milwaukee experiment using a secret shopper design, sending college student “testers,”
white and black, with fictitious names and resumes, to interview for entry-level, no-experiencerequired jobs, revealed the extent of this effect. For white applicants, the effect was large and
significant: only 17% of white testers who reported a “criminal record” were called back for an
interview, compared to 34% of white testers without a record.146 For black testers, the effect was
much stronger. Only 5% of black testers indicating a criminal record were called back, compared
to 14% of black testers without one. 147 Both wages and employment prospects are substantially
hampered by a criminal record. Because employment rates and income are associated with rates of
violent crime,148 it can be inferred that the decreases in employment and income associated with
140
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incarceration will feed back into higher crime rates as incarcerated persons return to their
communities.
Even if incapacitation provides an immediate benefit, the long-term effects of incarceration
may equal or outweigh any reduction in violence. A recent study employing a five-year time lag
analysis accounting for both incarceration and reentry rates found that the incapacitation effects of
imprisonment were completely offset by the crime-increasing effects of reentry.149 Higher rates of
incarceration and reentry were correlated with net increases in violent crime over time. 150 If the
criminogenic effects of incarceration grow over time, most studies of imprisonment, which use short
time frames, will fail to capture the damage. Indeed, the criminogenic effects of past incarceration
on an individual’s reentry do seem to be cumulative over time. 151 As the authors noted, these
findings do not unambiguously support the conclusion that incarceration has a net effect of
increasing crime. The reentry crime bump could be attributed to the fact that previously incarcerated
individuals have been released.152 In other words, one viable reading of the data is that
incapacitation is effective, and the crime-increasing qualities of prisoner reentry occur because
prisoners are no longer being incapacitated. However, the authors argue that because they have
controlled for variations in the overall incarceration rate, their findings on the criminogenic effect
of reentry should remain valid.153
F. A Very Brief Reflection on the Politics of Ludwig’s Work

Ultimately, Ludwig’s analysis of the costs and benefits of HB2265 missed many
potentially confounding factors. Like Mayor Emanuel and Superintendent McCarthy, Ludwig
focused on the individual behavior of gun carriers, not group-level, community-level, or city-level
drivers of violence. Ludwig’s work is influenced by politics: he is able to focus exclusively on the
individual, gun carrier level of analysis because that is the way political leaders frame the issue. He
is not concerned that the bill’s supporters would hesitate to use his work because it does not address
the many pertinent structural impacts of the proposed policy. Ludwig’s work also influences
politics: his promise of enormous benefits to the city provides Chicago’s political leaders with the
capital to sell the new policy as a “sure thing” and reinforces their understanding of the problem.
Ludwig’s memorandum and the political push in support of HB2265 are mutually reinforcing.
III. BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW

The next section analyzes Chicago neighborhood-level violence and gun sentencing data.
The goal is to examine whether Ludwig’s hypothesis that higher gun sentences will lead to lower
violent crime rates is supported by the data. This section briefly reviews some of the research
relevant to this investigation.
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A. Empirical Data on the Link between Crime and Punishment

The association between changes in violent crime rates and the length of criminal
sentences is not clear, as the studies cited below demonstrate. The “crime control” hypothesis
predicts that prosecutors and judges will respond to higher levels of community crime by imposing
harsher sentences.154 However, several studies have undermined the crime control hypothesis. One
study found that higher county-level violent crime rates did not increase the average length of
criminal sentences.155 A second study found that only the drug arrest rate, not the violent or property
crime rate, was significant in accounting for county-level variation in awarding lenient sentencing
dispositions.156 Finally, at least one study suggests that judges respond to higher rates of violence
with leniency: A 2005 study comparing courts across Pennsylvania found that courts in counties
with higher rates of violent crime cases were more likely to grant downward departures from
sentencing guidelines for violent crimes (resulting in shorter sentences) than judges in counties with
caseloads that had a smaller percentage of violent crime cases.157
A few studies have focused on whether changes in a locality’s crime rate (as opposed to
its absolute crime rate) influence sentence lengths. Researchers have not identified a clear
connection. A recent study of county-level sentencing outcomes in South Carolina found no
statistically significant effect of changes in crime rates on the decision to incarcerate or length of
sentence.158 Additionally, a study of Pennsylvania county-level sentencing found no evidence that
increases in violent crime rates were associated with longer prison sentences.159
Studies of departures from sentencing guidelines have also examined how socialcontextual features of courts affect sentencing, generally analyzing differences between counties in
the same state, not between neighborhoods in the same city. Studies of county-level difference have
found that departures from sentencing guidelines are affected by the percent Republican, age
composition, and urban status of a court’s surrounding community; 160 that larger courts are more
likely to depart downward from sentencing guidelines (imposing shorter sentences); 161 and that
court caseload and the racial composition of the community within a court’s jurisdiction affect
sentencing.162 In particular, researchers consistently find an inverse relationship between case
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volume measured by the court’s community size and average sentence length. 163
The violent crime rate is not generally found to impact the average length of criminal
sentences. In one study, other contextual factors like the racial demographics and property and drug
crime rates were closely associated with county-level differences in sentencing. 164 Counties with
more prosecutions for property and drug crimes generally imposed shorter sentences. 165 The causal
mechanism between crime rates and sentence lengths, to the extent such a link exists, has not been
established.
B. How Judges and Prosecutors Respond to Neighborhood Violence

Cook County judges and prosecutors play a major role in setting sentence lengths for gun
possession. Prosecutors often define their main role as creating public safety, and their main tool to
do this is criminal prosecution.166 Prosecutors are the most influential actors in determining sentence
lengths.167 Across the US, around 90-95 percent of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargains. 168
With prosecutors wielding great leverage and almost all cases resolved through plea bargaining, a
prosecutor’s sense of a “fair deal” can greatly affect sentencing.
The high volume of criminal cases in Cook County makes it difficult for prosecutors to
consider neighborhood-level circumstances. Around 200 prosecutors handle felony cases at “26 th
and California,” the Central Criminal Courts Building. 169 These prosecutors handle hundreds of
cases per year, and many describe struggling to keep up with their caseloads.170 The same is true of
criminal division felony judges, who hear around 800 new cases per year. 171 For context, a 1993
163
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study performed for the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court suggested that the court would need
65 judges—nearly twice as many as are currently employed—to adequately handle the annual
caseload of 28,000 felony cases.172
Other evidence supports the theory that prosecutors and judges do not consider
neighborhood-level factors like violent crime rates in imposing criminal sentences. Nicole Gonzalez
Van Cleve has studied the Cook County criminal legal system in extensive detail, conducting 104
interviews with Cook County judges, prosecutors, and public defenders and coordinating more than
1,000 hours of court-watching to build a large and unique dataset describing the processes of Cook
County courts.173 Anecdotally, the personal predilections of judges appear to affect the sentences
given. Van Cleve describes a judge who, because of her personal distaste for residential burglaries,
refused to approve a non-carceral plea bargain for a man accused of possessing marijuana because
he had been convicted of residential burglary twelve years prior.174 Another judge reluctantly
approved a light sentence for an older man dying of HIV and tuberculosis, but told the public
defender that his next client was going to “get it,” making clear that deviations from the “going
rate” for plea bargains were a limited resource. 175 There is little in these accounts to suggest that
judges are responding to fine-grained differences in individual cases, let alone neighborhood-level
trends.
In a few cases, judges and prosecutors may pay attention to where a defendant lives and
works. Van Cleve recounts a black defendant who lived in the city but worked in Winnetka, a white,
rich, suburban neighborhood. The prosecutor and judge were very attentive to this fact, which Van
Cleve attributes to their racialized concerns about a “bad guy” spending time in a well-off
neighborhood.176 But this situation is an exception to the rule, and there is little to suggest that Cook
County prosecutors and judges work with a detailed understanding of neighborhood circumstances.
IV. AN EMPIRICAL TEST

This empirical section tests Ludwig’s hypothesis that longer gun sentences are correlated
with reduced violent crime. Using Chicago neighborhood-level data on violent crime rates and
sentence lengths for illegal gun possession, I will adopt and test Ludwig’s hypothesis:
HO: As a result of longer sentences for gun possession, violence rates will remain
the same or increase.
HA: As a result of longer sentences for gun possession, violence rates will
decrease.
This analysis will not, and cannot, prove that higher gun sentences do, or do not, affect
crime. This work is analogous to a study of robberies and arrests in five Oklahoma City
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neighborhoods, which found no evidence to suggest that increased arrests deter future robberies.177
The researchers suggested that there might still be a deterrent effect of a higher arrest rate, but that
such an effect might be impossible to ascertain if the deterrence has reached an equilibrium.178 In
that study, there was no good way to decide whether the results suggested no deterrence or
consistent deterrence. Similarly, in this analysis, a failure to find a link between sentence lengths
and crime rates would not “prove” that higher gun sentences do not affect crime. As the authors of
the Oklahoma City study note, an ideal analysis would compare neighborhoods at the same time
and across different time periods to attempt to assess whether neighborhoods really remained at
“equilibrium” or if changes in punishment tend to precede changes in crime. 179 But there is not
enough data to conduct a conclusive analysis. Instead, the below analysis adds a new piece of
information to help understand whether the tenuously-supported connections between punishment
severity and crime truly exist.
As later sections will discuss, this analysis relies on a limited data set with a small sample
size. These and other limitations will make it more difficult to be confident that our results are
meaningful. However, the central claim of mandatory-minimum proponents is that people who
carry illegal guns are uniquely dangerous, making their incarceration extremely beneficial from a
public safety standpoint. The below pages test that claim and provide at least one additional data
point towards resolving it.
A. Selecting Variables

Many past studies have considered correlates of violent crime, and I will include the most
frequently used variables from those studies, where available. Additionally, because my analysis
focuses on comparisons between neighborhoods, whereas most research on this topic makes
comparisons between cities, I will omit some variables that do not make sense in a neighborhoodcomparison context. Finally, I will prioritize the use of variables that are captured by the most
accessible ZIP code-level data set, the 2011 American Community Survey 5-year estimates.
The following table presents a summary of control variables considered for the regression
analysis, focusing on variables that are frequently used in violent crime research:

177

Robert J. Bursik, Jr., et al., The Effect of Longitudinal Arrest Patterns on the Development of Robbery
Trends at the Neighborhood Level, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 431 (1990).
178

Id. at 446.

179

Id.
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Figure 3: Covariates for Regression Analysis
Variable
Mean illegal gun possession
sentence
% Black
Residential stability
% Households with income
below poverty line
% Female-headed households
% Age 15-29
% Unemployed

Included?
Yes

Reasoning
Dependent variable of interest

Yes
Yes
Yes

Frequently found significant
Frequently found significant
Frequently used

Yes
Yes
No

Frequently used
Frequently used
Found to be weakly connected (or not
connected) to violent crime; likely
collinear with poverty measure
Overlaps with % Female-headed
households; changes in marriage patterns
Used in city-to-city comparisons, but may
not be applicable to neighborhoods
Used in city-to-city comparisons; much
harder to measure across neighborhoods
Not as frequently used; potentially
collinear with other variables
Difficult to measure, not readily available
on neighborhood level

% Divorced

No

Population density,
population size
Socioeconomic inequality

No

Education

No

Social efficacy (e.g. trust in
neighbors)

No

No

Studies of violent crime use many socio-demographic variables to control for correlates of
the crime rate. The choice of variables is not always accompanied by a robust explanation of why
the variables chosen are relevant, although a number of variables are consistently used. For
example, a recent study analyzing the effects of incarceration on crime controlled for percent
unemployed, income, percent high school graduates, percent college graduates, percent age 18-24,
percent age 25-44, percent divorced, percent female-headed households, percent white, and percent
metro.180 The authors’ explanation of those choices was that they are, “consistent with the standard
empirical model used in the crime-incarceration literature.”181 But although some of these variables
may be somewhat frequently used, there is no “standard set” of control variables to deploy. As
Moody and Marvell note, “ . . . from a general perusal of the economic research literature, it is clear
that (i) researchers do not make full use of the potentially important control variables available, and
(ii) researchers have no evident methodology for selecting controls.” 182 On a larger scale, no
consensus has emerged as to the cause of the large declines in crime in the past few decades.183
180
Robert DeFina & Lance Hannon, For Incapacitation, There is No Time Like the Present: The Lagged
Effects of Prisoner Reentry on Property and Violent Crime Rates, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 1004, 1007 (2010).
181

Id.

182

Carlisle E. Moody & Thomas B. Marvell, On the Choice of Control Variables in the Crime Equation, 72
OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 696 (2010).
183

Vanessa Barker, Explaining the Great American Crime Decline: A Review of Blumstein and Wallman,
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A guiding principle is to limit the number of variables used to minimize the risk of false
positives. The ideal balance to strike is to use those variables, and only those variables, that are
theoretically linked to the violent crime rate. Over-inclusiveness can hide the relevant results: as
one study of homicide rates warns: “ . . . specification error can be induced by including irrelevant
regressors, and thus risks are involved in simply ‘trying on’ whatever variables are available in
standard data sources.”184 Additionally, the small sample size of neighborhoods counsels against
including too many variables.
Theoretically, measures of income, segregation, and social stability should all be relevant
in the analysis. Black, poor neighborhoods experience higher levels of policing, 185 leading to more
stops and more arrests, with possible implications for sentence lengths. 186 Similarly, poor
defendants and black defendants will experience discrimination at various points in the criminal
legal system, worsening their outcomes. 187 Certainly, the greater likelihood of not being released
on bond for poor defendants increases the likelihood of incarceration, and the time they will serve. 188
The above control variables were chosen because they were frequently used in violent
crime research, frequently found to be correlated with violence, and fit a neighborhood-level
analysis of violent crime. Percent black was chosen because it is very frequently used, measures
segregation, and measures the concentration of individuals who face the most racial-social
disadvantages.189 Residential stability—the percentage of families who have lived in the same
Goldberger and Rosenfeld, and Zimring, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 489, 490–91 (2010).
184
Steven F. Messner & Reid M. Golden, Racial Inequality and Racially Disaggregated Homicide Rates:
An Assessment of Alternative Theoretical Explanations, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 421, 432 (1992).
185
In early 2016, black Chicagoans experienced 71% of all police stops despite representing less than a third
of the city’s population. These statistics were measured after an agreement between the ACLU and the Chicago Police
Department designed to decrease racial discrimination in police stops; the disparity at the time of our analysis may have
been even higher. See ARLANDER KEYS, THE CONSULTANT’S FIRST SEMIANNUAL REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATORY STOP
AND PROTECTIVE PAT DOWN AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1, 2016 – JUNE 30, 2016 (2017), https://www.acluil.org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/the-consultants-first-semiannual-report-3-23-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZ63-V28R].
186
Past criminal convictions are a significant predictor of sentence outcomes for future crimes. See, e.g., Iain
Pardoe & Robert R. Weidner, Sentencing Convicted Felons in the United States: A Bayesian Analysis Using Multilevel
Covariates, 136 J. STAT. PLAN. & INFERENCE 1433, 1442 (2006) (finding that past carceral sentences increase the likelihood
that new charges will result in a carceral sentence, though this effect varies with the unemployment rate, race, and whether
the county’s geographic location).
187
See, e.g., Kutateladze et al., Cumulative Disadvantage: Examining Racial and Ethnic Disparity in
Prosecution and Sentencing, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 514 (2014); John Sutton, Structural Bias in the Sentencing of Felony
Defendants, 42 SOC. SCI. RES. 1207 (2013).
188
Many studies have found that pretrial detention (failing to make bail) increases the likelihood of receiving
a carceral sentence and the length of that sentence. See, e.g., John Clark and D. Alan Henry, The Pretrial Release Decision,
81 JUDICATURE 76 (1997); Tracy Nobiling et al., A Tale of Two Counties: Unemployment and Sentence Severity, 15 JUST.
Q. 459 (1998).
189
See, e.g., Judith R. Blau & Peter M. Blau, The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent
Crime, 47 AM SOC. REV. 114 (1982); Kenneth C. Land et al., Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Any
Invariances Across Time and Social Space?, 95 AM. J. SOC. 922 (1990); Steven F. Messner & Reid M. Golden, Racial
Inequality and Racially Disaggregated Homicide Rates: An Assessment of Alternative Theoretical Explanations, 30
CRIMINOLOGY 421, 432 (1992); William R. Smith, et al., Furthering the Integration of Routine Activity and Social
Disorganization, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 489 (2000); Thomas L. McNulty & Steven R. Holloway, Race, Crime, and Public
Housing in Atlanta: Testing a Conditional Effect Hypothesis, 79 SOC. FORCES 707 (2000); Edward S. Shihadeh & Darrell J.
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household for the last five years—has been found significant under theories that invoke the role of
social efficacy or social control in deterring crime. 190 As other measures of collective efficacy are
not readily available, residential stability serves as a proxy for more nuanced measures of collective
efficacy.191
Connections between family income and violent crime have been found in multiple
studies.192 Income can be measured by median income or by the percentage of households below
the poverty line. Lacking a good reason to prefer one to another, this analysis uses the percentage
of families in poverty, both because it was used slightly more often in the studies I surveyed and
because there is no need to transform the data (for example, taking the logarithm of income) so that
it scales with other variables.
Family structure and “disruption” is also a frequently used variable. Although it is not
always found to be significantly correlated with crime, 193 some analyses have identified family
structure as a significant determinant of neighborhood violence. 194 I use the percentage of femaleheaded household to measure this factor.
Finally, the prevalence of young people is added as a control variable. People “age out” of
crime, and violent crime is most prevalent among younger people; Blumstein found that arrest rates
for aggravated assault were highest among 21-year-olds.195 Some studies have followed this insight
and measured the proportion of population within certain age bands, although the bands used vary.
An age range of 15-29 is used here, in part because it is the age range most closely associated with
homicide.196
A few frequently-used covariates are not included here. Divorce rates have been used as a
control variable in violence research. But as the proportion of adults who have never married

Steffensmeier, Economic Inequality, Family Disruption, And Urban Black Violence: Cities as Units of Stratification and
Social Control, 73 SOC. FORCES 729 (1994).
190

For studies using residential stability, see Paul E. Bellair, Informal Surveillance and Street Crime: A
Complex Relationship, 38 CRIMINOLOGY 137, 154 (2000) (finding a “strong, positive” effect of residential stability in
reducing crime); Robert J. Sampson et al., Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277
SCIENCE 918, 921–922 (1997) (finding that residential stability correlates negatively with violent crime, although the effect
is nonsignificant when accounting for certain measures of collective efficacy).
191
For examples of survey questions used to measure social efficacy, see Christopher R. Browning et al.,
The Paradox of Social Organization: Networks, Collective Efficacy, and Violent Crime in Urban Neighborhoods, 83 SOC.
FORCES 503, 513–514 (2004).
192

See, e.g., Steven D Levitt, The Changing Relationship Between Income and Crime Victimization,
ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW – FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK 87, 88 (Sept. 1999); Land et al., supra note 189.
193
Robert DeFina & Lance Hannon, For Incapacitation, There is No Time Like the Present: The Lagged
Effects of Prisoner Reentry on Property and Violent Crime Rates, 39 SOC. SCI. RES. 1004, 1009 (2010) (finding that
percentage of female-headed homes was not significantly correlated with crime).
194

Shihadeh & Steffensmeier, supra note 189, at 744.

195

ALFRED BLUMSTEIN ET AL., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CRIMINAL CAREERS AND “CAREER
CRIMINALS”: VOLUME I, 23 (1986).
196

Kenneth C. Land et al., Structural Covariates of Homicide Rates: Are There Any Invariances Across Time
and Social Space?, 95 AM. J. SOC. 922, 926 n.9 (1990). In the regression run in Land’s paper, the specific range of ages
analyzed (15-24, 15-29, 20-34, 15-29) did not substantially alter the regression results. The same should apply in the analysis
conducted in this paper.
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increases over time,197 it may be more valuable to directly consider family composition than divorce
rates. Unemployment is also not used due to our specific focus on violent crime. Researchers have
found that increases in unemployment are correlated with increases in property crime, but not
violent crime.198 Some studies have even suggested that increasing unemployment is associated
with decreasing violent crime rates.199 Income inequality is also not used here because it is more
difficult to measure on a cross-neighborhood level than on a cross-city level (What is the appropriate
reference group? The whole city? Nearby neighborhoods? Inequality within the neighborhood?).
Additionally, some studies have found the relationship between income inequality and violent crime
to be highly collinear with the relationship between overall income and violent crime, so it should
be possible to account for much of this relationship by including a measure of overall income
(percent households in poverty). 200 Finally, measures of education are not used because they were
infrequently used in the studies I surveyed and because they are likely collinear with the other
control variables used here.
The equation associated with this regression analysis is as follows:
Violent crime index = β0 + β1(mean sentence) + β2(% Black) + β3(residential
stability) + β4(% households in poverty) + β5(% female-headed households) +
β6(% age 15-29)
A final task is to address endogeneity issues. A description of this problem is given by
M.B. Gordon:
. . . if crime rates and probabilities of punishment are negatively correlated, one
cannot distinguish between the hypothesis that higher probabilities of punishment
cause lower crime rates or the hypothesis that higher crime rates cause lower
probabilities of punishment (because of police overloading). Thus, studies that
consider simultaneous (cross-sectional) data can only detect correlations.201
Although Gordon’s example focuses on crime rates and policing, the same problem exists
in understanding the connections between violent crime and sentence lengths. It might seem that
197

Wendy Wang & Kim Parker, Record Share of Americans Have Never Married, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/09/24/record-share-of-americans-have-never-married/ [https://
perma.cc/P7CH-YEJM].
198
See, e.g., Ming-Jen Lin, Does Unemployment Increase Crime? Evidence from U.S. Data 1974-2000, 43
J. HUM. RESOURCES 413 (2008); Mikko Altonen et al., Examining the Generality of the Unemployment–Crime Association,
51 CRIMINOLOGY 561, 582 (2013) (“All our models indicate that the within-individual association between unemployment
and crime is consistent for property crime, whereas violent crime and drunk driving are not associated with unemployment
in a meaningful way. Over longer follow-up, those people who commit violent crimes and drive while drunk are certainly
unemployed for much longer times than most, but they do not seem to be more likely to commit these crimes while they are
registered as unemployed”).
199
Steven Raphael & Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, Identifying the Effect of Unemployment on Crime, 44 J. LAW &
ECON. 259, 260 (2001).
200

Land et al., supra note 196.

201

M. B. Gordon, A Random Walk in the Literature on Criminality: A Partial and Critical View on Some
Statistical Analyses and Modelling Approaches, 21 EUR. J. APPLIED MATHEMATICS 283, 287 (2010).
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rising violence would be met with longer sentences, masking the potential effect of longer sentences
on violent crime rates.
There are a few reasons to believe that there is no major endogeneity problem in the
proposed analysis. First, changes in crime rates have not been shown to influence criminal sentence
lengths.202 Second, the extremely high felony case volume in the Cook County courts suggests that
judges and prosecutors are not able to closely consider each case of illegal gun-carrying, decreasing
the likelihood that variations in sentencing reflect fine-grained case differences.203 Finally, a survey
of neighborhoods across Chicago finds substantial variations in gun sentences in both high and lowcrime neighborhoods, contradicting the theory that higher-violence neighborhoods will tend to have
higher gun sentences.
Figure 4: Gun Sentence Lengths and Violent Crime Rates

Neighborhood Avg Gun Sentence

Gun sentences are very weakly associated with
violent crime rates
35
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15
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y = 0.0316x + 20.838
R² = 0.0049
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20
30
40
Neighborhood Violence Rate per 1000
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The above graph, which maps the 2010 violence rate of Chicago neighborhoods against
average gun sentences in 2008 and 2009, shows that violence rates are essentially not connected to
gun sentences.204 Every additional serious violent crime per 1,000 neighborhood residents is
associated with an increase in sentence length of only 0.03 months (0.9 days). This association
accounts for less than 1% of the variation in gun sentences. Chicago demonstrates what the theories
described in the literature review section suggest: prosecutors and judges do not respond to local
202

Chester L. Britt, Social Context and Racial Disparities in Punishment Decisions, 17 JUST. Q. 707, 725
(2000); Rhys Hester & Eric L. Sevigny, Court Communities in Local Context: A Multilevel Analysis of Felony Sentencing
in South Carolina, 39 J. CRIME & JUST. 55, 67 (2016).
203

See generally NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY (2016).

204

Graph made using Chicago city crime and Cook County Circuit Court Clerk sentencing. Note that the
graph only includes neighborhoods with 20 or more gun sentences in 2008 and 2009. See Crimes – 2010, CHICAGO DATA
PORTAL, https://data.cityofchicago.org/Public-Safety/Crimes-2010/q4de-h6yq [perma.cc/5BLM-YPYL].
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crime rates by imposing longer criminal sentences.
B. Data Collection

Much of the covariate data was compiled through the American Community Survey. 205But
calculating the rates of violent crime and the mean length of gun sentences required a number of
design decisions. The below section describes how I collected this data and identified the
appropriate time frame for the analysis.
Both homicide rates and a “violence index” of violent crime, including rape, robbery,
aggravated assault, and homicide, have been used to understand the connections between social
factors and violence. Studies using homicide rates have found different correlates of violence than
studies using violence indices.206 Homicide rates are often privileged as a measure of violence
because homicide is the most consistently-reported crime.207 However, in this paper’s analysis of
Chicago neighborhood violence, it would be inappropriate to use only homicide due to the small
number of homicides and large number of neighborhoods analyzed. A variance of just a few
homicides could create a false impression of meaningful difference. By using an index of violent
crime instead, this paper smooths out some of the expected year-to-year variations in violent crime
by examining a larger study set of crimes. I adopt the same index of violent crime used by Ludwig:
homicide, robbery, criminal sexual assault, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery.208 The index
is measured at an annual rate per 1,000 residents.
Calculating the average length of gun sentences is more difficult. The Chicago Justice
Project obtained data for all Cook County felony convictions between 2005 and 2009 from the Cook
County Circuit Court.209 This data includes address and zip-code-level location data, sentence
categories (probation, boot camp, prison, etc.,) and sentence lengths. Although Ludwig primarily
focused on aggravated unlawful use of a weapon cases, 210 a fuller picture of firearm convictionrelated incapacitation would include charges for unlawful use of a weapon (firearm) by a felon. 211
Accordingly, this analysis considers both categories of convictions.
The mean sentence, not the median, is most relevant to this analysis. The premise of
Ludwig’s incapacitation hypothesis is that the more months a person is held in jail, the fewer
opportunities they will have to commit crimes in their community. Using the median sentence to
understand neighborhood-level differences would not make sense, since the goal is to get at the
number of total incapacitation-months. Even if every ZIP code had a median sentence of 24 months,
if some areas have a mean sentence of 30 months and others a mean sentence of 24 months, there
should be more incapacitation and lower levels of violent crime in the areas with mean sentences
205

American FactFinder, U.S. Census Bureau, https://factfinder.census.gov (last accessed July 15, 2017).

206

Jeffery T. Ulmer et al., Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Structural Disadvantage and Crime: White,
Black, and Hispanic Comparisons, 93 SOC. SCI. Q. 799, 805 (2012).
207

Id.

208

LUDWIG, supra note 6.

209

Conviction Data, CHICAGO JUSTICE PROJECT, https://chicagojustice.org/open-data/cook-county-courtdata/ [link to the website, and each data set as follows: https://perma.cc/9ED2-VNVE; https://perma.cc/MPM6-XNQV;
https://perma.cc/WJX5-XMBJ; https://perma.cc/5XFJ-WGC3].
210

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/24-1.6.

211

720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/24-1.1.
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of 30 months. However, the raw mean is also not an appropriate measure of incapacitation. In 2008,
one defendant was sentenced on two counts of Unlawful Use of a Weapon by a Felon and was
sentenced to 31 years in prison.212 This person will be in prison for a long time, but it could be
misleading to include his full sentence when approximating the total impact of incapacitation for a
given sample period.
A “cap” on sentence lengths can address the problem of outlier sentences. This analysis
uses sentence data from 2008 and 2009 to measure violence rates in 2010. The key to setting the
sentence cap is to realize that almost all individuals convicted of firearms offenses serve only 50%
of the nominal sentence.213 Accordingly, the cap for the sentence length of criminal convictions in
2008 should be 72 months (36 months served) and the cap for the sentence length of criminal
convictions in 2009 should be 48 months (24 months served). This cap represents the maximum
length of incapacitation that could affect 2010 crime rates; a person convicted on January 1, 2008
and given a 72-month sentence would be imprisoned through the end of 2010, as would a person
given a 48-month sentence on January 1, 2009. Because of credit for time served, this cap is not
airtight; the difference between a 72 and 96-month sentence might be meaningful if a person has
been given 12 months of credit for time served when they are sentenced. Still, this cap allows for a
reasonable approximation of the actual incapacitation effect without introducing specific controls
that would require tracking every convicted person individually, making the model unduly
complicated.
The following conversions are used to calculate sentences other than imprisonment.
Probation, conditional discharge and supervision sentences are coded as having a length of “0.”
This is because under each of these sentences, individuals are immediately released into their
communities.214 Additionally, where time served equaled or exceeded a prison sentence, the
sentence is coded as “probation” or “time served,” and sentence length given as “0,” because there
is no forward-looking incarceration imposed. Sentence length is also given as “0” for community
service and home confinement. Boot camp, a 120-day program in which convicted individuals live
in a military-style camp, is coded as having a length of 10 months. The average length of
incarceration for these individuals was five months, including an average one-month wait period
before starting the program and four months in the program. 215 For parity with prison sentences, I
double the calculated length to 10 months (because statutory “good time” translates a 10-month jail
sentence into approximately five months imprisonment). 216
Using this methodology produces the following range of average (mean) prison sentences
212

The defendant’s case number is: 2008CR1871902 in supra note 209.

213

An October 2010 report on sentencing in Illinois stated: “ . . . sentences imposed in court on all but
murder, some sex offenses and a few other serious crimes are typically reduced in half by ‘statutory’ or ‘day-for-day’ good
time. This credit is awarded up front and in advance of time being served. It can be taken away as a disciplinary measure,
but seldom is.” Malcolm C. Young, Setting the Record Straight: the Truth About “Early Release” From Illinois Prisons,
BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC – NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 4 (Oct. 27, 2010).
214

For an explanation of each sentencing outcome, see Probation for Adults, ILL. CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK
COUNTY,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/ABOUTTHECOURT/OfficeoftheChiefJudge/ProbationDepartments/
ProbationforAdults.aspx [perma.cc/U28N-V5SU].
215
IMPACT INCARCERATION PROGRAM 2003 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, ILL. DEP’T CORR. (Dec. 2003), https://www.illinois.gov/idoc/reportsandstatistics/Documents/
2003IIPAnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KUY3-A74N].
216

Young, supra note 213.
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for UUW by a felon and aggravated UUW across our sample neighborhoods:
Figure 5: Convictions and Average Sentence by Neighborhood

60628

Convictions for Agg UUW and UUW by Felon (2008-2009)
Neighborhoods
# Convictions
Average Sentence
(months)
269
18.9
Pullman, Roseland

60636

West Englewood

191

17.7

60620

Auburn Gresham

173

21.0

60621

Englewood

169

19.6

60617

South Chicago, East Side

165

16.6

60619

Chatham, Avalon Park

164

20.9

60609

Armour Square, Bridgeport

134

20.6

60649

South Shore

132

20.0

60651

Austin, Humboldt Park

128

27.4

60629

Gage Park, West Lawn

125

18.8

60637

Hyde Park, Woodlawn

120

20.3

60644

Austin

107

26.9

60623

North Lawndale, South Lawndale

100

22.3

60624

West Garfield Park, East Garfield Park

99

26.5

60643

Beverly, Morgan Park

87

13.8

60639

Austin, Belmont Cragin

78

22.3

60608

Bridgeport, Pilsen

59

17.8

60615

Hyde Park, Kenwood

55

23.7

60632

Archer Heights, Brighton Park

55

15.1

60612

Near West Side

54

25.6

60653

Douglas, Grand Boulevard

54

16.3

60647

Hermosa, Humboldt Park

36

27.9

60622

Humboldt Park, Logan Square

33

26.7

60652

Ashburn

28

17.1

60618

Avondale, Irving Park

23

31.0

60641
Sum/
Average

Belmont Cragin, Irving Park

22

21.5

2660

20.7 (average of all
sentences)

Zip Code
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To finalize the model it is necessary to define a time lag between the moment of sentencing
and the time at which violent crime rates are calculated. To evaluate the effects of incapacitation, a
model would ideally account for the specific start and end dates of incarceration to calculate how
many people convicted of illegal gun possession are “off the streets.” This delay is not easily
measured. As one meta-analysis states: “the lag to be used is not evident and depends on the type
of variable.”217 Many studies use a one-year lag between the independent variables and the crime
rate.218
The average length of a gun sentence among the neighborhoods in our analysis is 20.7
months, which translates to about 10.3 months served in jail or prison. But sentences are bimodally
distributed; in 2008 and 2009, most sentences either involved no forward-looking incarceration or
were for lengths of 36 months or more:
Figure 6: Distribution of Gun Possession Sentences
Gun possession sentences generally non-carceral / time served or 36+
months in selected neighborhoods
1200
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Not carceral 1-11 months 12-23 months 24-35 months 36-47 months 48+ months
or time served

The large majority of individuals who are convicted of illegal gun-carrying either receive
no forward-looking carceral sentences or are given sentences of 36 months or greater. As explained
above, incarcerated individuals serve only about 50% of the nominal length of their sentence.
Accordingly, most convicted individuals who are incarcerated (i.e., don’t receive probation, time
served, or community service) will be imprisoned for 18-24 months or longer. This validates the
decision to use 2008 and 2009 sentencing data and 2010 violent crime rates. Many people sentenced
for gun possession in 2008 and 2009 remain imprisoned for part or all of 2010. The mean sentence
is a reasonable proxy for the extent of this imprisonment and the corresponding degree of
incapacitation one would expect under Ludwig’s theory.

217

M. B. Gordon, A Random Walk in the Literature on Criminality: A Partial and Critical View on Some
Statistical Analyses and Modelling Approaches, 21 EUR. J. APPLIED MATHEMATICS 283, 287 (2010).
218

Id.
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C. Results

It is now possible to conduct a multiple regression analysis and test for the significance of
the relationship between gun sentences and violent crime. The following table of summary statistics
presents the data used in this regression:

ZIP
Code

Figure 7: Table of Summary Statistics
Avg gun
%
% Recent
% Below
sent.
Black
Move219
Poverty
(months)
17.8 16.5%
50.3%
28.6%

60608

2010
crime
index
7.3

60609

15.7

20.6

29.1%

45.9%

28.6%

22.8%

24.4%

60612

24.3

25.6

60.4%

53.7%

31.6%

24.9%

26.8%

60615

12.8

23.7

61.5%

52.9%

24.3%

16.9%

27.0%

60617

16.7

16.6

54.3%

31.6%

25.1%

27.6%

20.2%

60618

5.5

31.0

2.8%

50.4%

12.6%

10.8%

24.5%

60619

25.3

20.9

97.7%

36.7%

24.0%

31.2%

19.9%

60620

23.1

21.0

98.0%

36.5%

28.0%

38.8%

21.7%

60621

38.3

19.6

97.9%

42.2%

45.5%

42.6%

23.6%

60622

10.3

26.7

8.7%

60.6%

17.9%

10.4%

32.1%

60623

15.9

22.3

33.3%

46.2%

34.8%

32.1%

27.8%

60624

35.7

26.5

95.8%

47.2%

43.7%

44.8%

26.7%

60628

23.5

18.9

94.8%

31.0%

25.7%

33.9%

22.1%

60629

12.3

18.8

25.2%

36.4%

22.5%

24.1%

24.9%

60632

6.8

15.1

1.9%

40.1%

21.4%

18.9%

25.3%

60636

34.1

17.7

95.3%

38.5%

40.6%

41.5%

25.4%

60637

26.5

20.3

78.3%

51.3%

34.9%

31.6%

26.7%

60639

9.9

22.3

17.9%

44.3%

22.4%

25.0%

24.6%

60641

5.5

21.5

3.0%

41.2%

16.1%

16.3%

21.5%

60643

11.3

13.8

71.6%

24.7%

11.3%

24.2%

17.1%

60644

30.7

26.9

93.4%

42.9%

33.2%

38.2%

22.8%

60647

8.5

27.9

7.6%

56.8%

22.5%

13.3%

29.4%

60649

23.9

20.0

94.6%

50.1%

29.0%

27.8%

20.7%

60651

21.7

27.4

65.8%

40.5%

31.4%

35.3%

24.5%

60652

7.6

17.1

50.2%

24.5%

12.1%

20.1%

22.1%

60653

14.8

16.3

92.3%

50.9%

35.8%

31.0%

19.4%

219
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A multiple regression analysis of the above data, with the violent crime index as the
dependent variable, delivers the following results:
Figure 8: Regression Results

Intercept
Mean gun sentence

Coefficient
(Standard error)

P-value

-16.08 (8.87)

0.09

0.48
(0.25)

0.08

Percent Black

0.14
(0.04)

0.00

Residential stability (Moved 2005 or later)

-0.20
(0.21)

0.35

Percent poverty

0.46
(0.30)

0.14

Percent female-headed households

0.12
(0.33)

0.72

Percent age 15-29

0.37
(0.34)

0.29

R-Squared
Number Observations
ANOVA significance F

0.91
26
6.54E-09

The explanatory power of the regression is very high, predicting 91% of variation in
serious violent crime rates among ZIP codes. The percentage of black residents is significantly
correlated with violence at a 99% significance level, and the mean gun sentence is significantly
correlated with violence at a 90% significance level. Mean gun sentences are positively correlated
with violence, meaning that higher gun sentences are correlated with higher levels of violent crime.
Each increase of one percentage point black population in a ZIP code is associated with an
additional 0.14 serious violent crimes per 1,000 residents per year, while each increase of one month
in the mean gun sentence is associated with an additional 0.48 serious violent crimes per 1,000
residents per year. Although the coefficient of the mean gun sentence is higher, the range of
variation between the two values is very different. The percentage of black residents in our zip
codes ranges from a low of 1.9% to a high of 98.0%, while average gun sentences range from 13.8
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months to 31.0 months.
The variables in this analysis are not highly correlated, as shown below. The exception is
that the percentage of female-headed households is highly correlated with both the percentage of
black residents and the percentage of residents living in poverty. In general, these levels of
collinearity provide some assurance that collinearity problems are not disrupting the findings.
Figure 9: Correlation Analysis
Mean gun
sentence
Mean gun
sentence
Percent
Black
Residential
stability
Percent
poverty
Percent
femaleheaded
Percent age
15-29

Percent
Black

Residential
stability

Percent
poverty

Percent
femaleheaded

Percent
age 15-29

1.00
-0.19

1.00

0.59

-0.27

1.00

0.04

0.58

0.25

1.00

-0.13

0.83

-0.30

0.78

1.00

0.50

-0.47

0.69

0.17

-0.30

1.00

D. Discussion

Even for an incapacitation skeptic, the results above are very surprising. Higher gun
sentences are associated with higher levels of serious violent crime. This finding not only fails to
confirm Ludwig’s hypothesis, but seems to provide evidence for the opposite.
The most natural explanation would be to take a page from Levitt’s study of imprisonment
and crime. Could judges and prosecutors be responding to higher levels of neighborhood crime with
longer penalties? I have already shown that there is little evidence that prosecutors or judges use
neighborhood-level data to guide prosecution, and as Figure 4 shows, gun sentences are evenly
distributed among high- and low-violence neighborhoods.
It could be that violence substitution is so powerful that incremental imprisonment
increases crime. This would be out of line with the studies of imprisonment surveyed above, which
suggest that imprisonment decreases crime, although the effect is small. Still, the amount of research
conducted on sentencing for specific crimes is limited. It is much more common to review the rates
of imprisonment for an entire county or state, not to break down how changes in sentences for
specific crimes affect community crime rates.
The clearest thing that can be said for now may be that this analysis does not support
Ludwig’s hypothesis that gun sentence enhancements reduce crime. These results follow SPAC and
others in failing to find that longer sentences for gun-carrying are associated with violence

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jlasc/vol23/iss2/1

2020]

THE TRUTH LIMPS AFTER

109

reduction.220 The positive association between longer sentences and higher rates of violent crime
provides one more reason to pause before using sentence enhancements to reduce violence.
Proposals to selectively incapacitate by targeting and imprisoning “high risk” individuals
have generally been too good to be true. Jens Ludwig himself reached this conclusion in a previous
study of the “Project Exile” sentence enhancements in Virginia. He and co-author Stephen Raphael
wrote, “ . . . crime control strategies that primarily involve tough sentencing enhancements for some
designated group of offenders believed to represent a high-risk to society seldom deliver their
promised punch.”221 Gun sentence enhancements may be another one of these minimally effective
strategies.
All of the limitations described above still apply to this analysis. No causal relationship
can be drawn from the data available to us. The small sample size of neighborhoods makes it
difficult to accurately assess the correlations. And the rough methodology of defining sentence
lengths and time lags invites the possibility that the results are a product of design choice, not the
underlying data. With those caveats, this analysis follows much other research in failing to support
Ludwig’s hypothesis that sentence enhancements substantially reduce violent crime.
V. THE POLITICS OF NON-PARTISANSHIP

Even as Ludwig writes in support of a policy that he presents as a windfall, he insists that
his work is not political. He predicts confidently that the proposed sentence enhancements of
HB2265 would prevent 400 serious crimes annually and provide a five-to-one return on investment.
At the same time, he writes, “While the University of Chicago Crime Lab does not take political
positions, including offering views about specific pieces of proposed legislation, we do believe it is
important for policymakers to have as accurate a sense as possible for the potential costs and
benefits associated with new legislative proposals.” When political actions are hidden, it becomes
more difficult to engage them and expose the ideological underpinnings that attach to the application
of social science research. Only by analyzing Ludwig’s actions as political can one understand the
limitations, assumptions, and blind spots inherent in his arguments.
In presenting his work, Ludwig explicitly ties his lack of political motive to his reliability;
it is because he has no agenda that we should trust especially him to present “as accurate a sense as
possible” of the merits of the proposed bill. One might quibble with the question of whether research
can ever fail to be political: in Howard Becker’s words, the meaningful question may not be whether
to take sides, but instead whose side to take. 222 But even among those who value “objectivity”
among researchers, Ludwig fails to adopt a neutral stance.
In Ludwig’s presentation of his estimate, he fails to address any of the ample evidence that
sentence enhancements do not reduce crime. This is, in effect, the entire question of his analysis:
will imprisoning gun carriers for longer periods reduce crime? In an exchange with a Chicago
Tribune columnist, mentioned above, he writes that much of the empirical evidence against sentence
enhancements is “not very good.”223 But Ludwig does not even grapple with the evidence that
220
ILL. SENT’G POL’Y ADVISORY COUNCIL, TRENDS ANALYSIS: UNLAWFUL USE OF A WEAPON 2 (2014),
http://www.icjia.state.il.us/spac/pdf/spac_trends_analysis_report_09_2014.pdf [perma.cc/QPM6-FL4Z].
221
Jens Ludwig & Steven Raphael, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of Project Exile, in
EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE at 282 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003).
222

Howard Becker, Whose Side Are We On?,14. SOC. PROBLEMS 3 (1967).

223

Eric Zorn, Reasonable Doubt About Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2013),
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weighs against him. For the purposes of the public debate, as Ludwig chooses to enter it, the
numerous studies and evaluations cited by the 32 professors who wrote in opposition to HB2265
might as well not exist.224
Ludwig’s public presentation of the evidence spoke in absolutes and certainties. In his
column in the Chicago Tribune, he wrote, “Our research finds that at least 3,800 crimes, including
more than 400 serious violent crimes, would be prevented each year in Illinois because the people
who would commit those crimes would be in prison.” 225 The crimes would be prevented, period.
And when Ludwig admits uncertainty, he does so only to suggest that the true benefits are even
greater than he is willing to estimate: the real costs will probably be smaller and the actual benefits
even larger. For example, he writes that an increase in sentence lengths for gun-carrying is likely
to:
x

Cost less, perhaps substantially less, than the State’s sentencing advisory body
estimates: “The best available evidence, however, suggests that the true costs associated
with the legislation are likely to be lower than this figure – perhaps substantially lower
– because of the expected deterrent effect of more consistent punishment for UUW.” 226
Reduce the prison population by preventing violent crimes: “One important way to
reduce the over-representation of disadvantaged groups in prison is to reduce prison
sentences for selected crimes, particularly those that do not pose a direct threat of
violence to the public. Another way to reduce the prison population is to prevent
seriously violent crimes of the sort that most people agree merit serious prison
sentences.”227
Substantially outweigh the negative effects of increased incarceration: “We have no
way of knowing what [the] unmeasured social costs of imprisonment are at present. But
our calculations suggest that unless the collateral costs of incarceration are multiple
times the direct DOC budget costs, the proposed legislation would still be likely to pass
a benefit-cost test.”228

x

x

The only factor Ludwig suggests may decrease the impact of sentence enhancements is the
“social costs” of imprisonment, and he essentially writes these off as very unlikely to outweigh the
calculated benefits.
The evidence Ludwig marshals in support of the bill simply does not show itself to
objectively lead to the conclusion that sentence enhancements are a “sure deal” for Illinois. This is
where Ludwig’s claims to objective neutrality, and the legitimacy associated with that stance, fall
short. To argue this point is not to say that Ludwig wrote in bad faith. It is only to say that Ludwig
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2013/10/mandatory_minimums.html
3D3X].
224

[https://perma.cc/3XT5-

STEPHANIE KOLLMANN & DOMINIQUE D. NONG, COMBATING GUN VIOLENCE IN ILLINOIS: EVIDENCEBASED SOLUTIONS, NW. L. BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC (2013), http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?filename=3&article=1000&context=jclc_symposium&type=additional [perma.cc/X47D-VM49].
225

Ludwig, supra note 29.

226

LUDWIG, supra note 6, at 1.

227
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formed his own opinion on a research question of deep importance to him. He and others at the
Crime Lab grew attached to that position. In advocating for that position, Ludwig failed to account
for the limitations of his argument and tilted his analysis of the proposal’s uncertainty to make his
analysis seem stronger than it was.
At this point, Ludwig stopped presenting only the “strongest possible social science
research.” He started advocating for a policy he believed in. This is a basic form of political
engagement: making a partisan argument for one’s position, emphasizing its strengths, and
downplaying its weaknesses. One might argue that this is inevitable for researchers. There is too
much uncertainty, too many gaps in what is known; one cannot fail to wade in, but must make
assumptions and guesses. Still, it is critical to acknowledge where one has taken a side, and what
side one has taken, as Ludwig fails to do here.
A. Political and Ethical Action in Ludwig’s Analysis

Even if the Crime Lab’s analysis was, as John Maki charged, “one of the primary pieces
of a public relations campaign designed to pass a symbolic tough-on-crime bill,”229 Ludwig might
protest that the use of his work for political ends does not make his work inherently political. Of
course good research will be used in political actors’ attempts to enact public policy. But in applying
his research to a specific piece of legislation, Ludwig acts politically and fails to grapple with the
estimate that the proposed bill will imprison 6,000 people—mostly black, poor people—annually.
He also does not seriously engage the question of alternative investments and political agendasetting.
As a result of the sentence enhancements in HB2265, 6,000 additional people would be
imprisoned annually, as estimated by SPAC. 230 Almost all of these people would be black; 79% of
people in Illinois imprisoned for Unlawful Use of a Weapon offenses are black, according to Illinois
Department of Corrections data.231 In Cook County, the disparity is even greater: 83% of people
imprisoned for Unlawful Use of a Weapon are black, while only 3% are white. 232 According to
these estimates, 4,800 black people who would otherwise be free would be imprisoned under the
proposed sentence enhancements.233 Although SPAC did not estimate the income of these
individuals, it is safe to assume that the large majority of them are poor. 234
How would Illinois change if 4,800 additional black people were incarcerated each year?
Ludwig gives a nod to the harm this change might bring but treats the impact as, essentially,
unknowable. He writes, “But it is almost surely the case that imprisonment also creates other
229
Eric Zorn, Reasonable Doubt About Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 18, 2013),
http://blogs.chicagotribune.com/news_columnists_ezorn/2013/10/mandatory_minimums.html
[https://perma.cc/3XT53D3X].
230

Id. at 2.

231

ILL. SENT’G POL’Y ADVISORY COUNCIL, HOUSE BILL 6193 SENTENCE ENHANCEMENTS FOR UNLAWFUL
USE OF A WEAPON (UUW) OFFENSES, at 7 (2016), http://www.icjia.state.il.us/spac/pdf/HB6193_UUW_FA.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WF8M-XJSZ].
232
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233

Author calculations.

234

For an analysis of pre-incarceration incomes of imprisoned people, see Bernadette Rabuy & Daniel Kopf,
Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the Pre-Incarceration Incomes of the Imprisoned, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, at 3 (2015),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/income.html [perma.cc/M7QA-LGQR].
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collateral costs to society, such as the adverse effects on families and children and even entire
communities. We have no way of knowing what these unmeasured social costs of imprisonment are
at present.”235 This statement sets up the reduction in violence caused by sentence enhancements as
essentially known and the harms of incarceration as essentially unknowable, except for the financial
costs of running prisons. However, numerous studies have documented how incarceration takes
resources from families, increases behavioral problems among children, and negatively “marks” an
incarcerated person for life, as described above.
This evidence was available at the time Ludwig wrote his memorandum. It would not be
difficult to estimate the money families will pay on phone calls, prison visits, and commissary
funds; the lost earnings of the imprisoned individuals; and the trauma inflicted on children and
families. None of this is considered. Ludwig only discusses the potential benefits, and renders
invisible the negative impact of incarceration on the (mostly black) communities where its use is
most prevalent.
Political scientist E.E. Schattschneider wrote, “The definition of the alternatives is the
supreme instrument of power.”236 There are many questions a social scientist might ask about a
policy that proposes to reduce violence by putting around 6,000 people in prison, at an annual cost
of around $130 million. They might ask, “How many crimes will that prevent?” They might ask,
“How will that affect communities?” Or they might ask, “How does that compare to other $130
million interventions?” Then, they might consider any subset of the possible dimensions of each
question. The questions one asks and the possibilities one explores heavily determine the results of
one’s analysis. Ludwig’s narrowing of scope prevents certain questions from being raised: for
example, what are the long-term consequences of investing in policies with positive externalities
(programs for children, resources for families and communities) versus policies with negative
externalities (increased imprisonment)?
In LANGUAGE OF THE GUN, Bernard Harcourt explores the decisions researchers make in
deciding how to conduct research and present their results. He argues that social scientists must
embrace the paradigm of “dirty hands:” one cannot do social-scientific work without making a range
of assumptions that will strongly guide the conclusions of one’s work. 237 In deciding what
assumptions to make and how to draw conclusions from one’s findings, one makes “leaps of faith”
between the evidence and one’s conclusions.
Harcourt develops his argument through an analysis of Steven Levitt’s article on the
economics of imprisoning children, Juvenile Crime and Punishment. Levitt’s article studies the link
between punishment and crime, and compares states with different levels of punitiveness towards
children to draw conclusions about the deterrence effect of harsher punishments. 238 Levitt argues
that this evidence can be used to understand whether deterrence is more effective than
incapacitation.239 However, Harcourt rebuts that there is no feasible way to tell how much of an
estimated crime decrease was caused by incapacitation or deterrence; Levitt takes a leap of faith,
guided by the rational actor theory of economics, to build an argument about which is more
235
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236

ELMER E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN
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237
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effective, and why.240 Levitt presents as a conclusion of his work something that is actually an
assumption Levitt carried into his analysis.
Harcourt conducts a similar analysis of sociologist Phillipe Bourgois’ ethnography of New
York Puerto Rican drug dealers, IN SEARCH OF RESPECT: SELLING CRACK IN EL BARRIO. Harcourt
praises his work as a “masterpiece,” but notes that his policy recommendations—from free
childcare, to large surges in transfer benefits, to accessible health care—do not follow cleanly, or
indeed, nearly at all, from his ethnographic observations. 241 Or, to the extent that they do, they do
so only if one has taken on the frame with which Bourgois sees the world. 242 Bourgois, like Levitt,
fills in the gaps of what he can prove with what he believes. And in filling the gaps, Harcourt
concludes, researchers necessarily dirty their hands, for the way they fill those gaps plays a large
role in determining the conclusions they reach. 243 Harcourt does not argue that this gap-filling is
illicit or mistaken; instead, this inevitable step in research and analysis should be noticed, accounted
for, and discussed.
Whether taking a leap of faith is necessarily political is up for debate, but it is, undoubtedly,
an ethical choice. Harcourt describes this as the “shaping of the human subject.”244 For example, in
considering the effect of imprisoning children solely in economic terms, one takes the position “that
juvenile and adult incarceration are in some sense fungible.” 245 An economic analysis allows one
to weigh and trade the imprisonment of adults and children; both can be analyzed in economic
terms. There are other ethical dimensions. Micheail Ward was 18 years old when he shot Hadiya
Pendleton; he was 17 years old when he was convicted of a gun offense that, according to the
proponents of HB2265, should have sent him to prison for three years. Ludwig’s leap of faith is
looking at Ward and other gun carriers and jumping from the modest evidence supporting sentence
enhancements to a firm conclusion that incapacitation guarantees the effectiveness of HB2265. But
his ethical decision is to view Micheail Ward primarily as a source of harm to be controlled instead
of as a source of unmet potential.
In claiming that his only role is to present the best evidence, Ludwig conceals the enormous
human infrastructure—the beliefs, commitments, and experiences—that frame his reasoning. By
denying his own subjectivity, Ludwig obscures a consideration that belongs in our discussion of
public policy: that the commitments and beliefs of those who are allowed to debate policy
determine, in large part, the policy we get. This means that the assumptions, beliefs and
commitments of those who guide policy discussions must be fair game for discussion; otherwise,
those participants are taking some of the most important action off of the table.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE MEMORANDUM’S LEGACY

I have shown that there are many reasons to believe that violence substitution will follow
gun carrier imprisonment, presented a new analysis that fails to support Ludwig’s hypothesis, and
argued that the Crime Lab’s advocacy cannot be understood as apolitical. If the focus on one man’s
240
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research seems strange, consider that Ludwig’s work lived on in Chicago long after the debate
quieted. His validation of the punishment paradigm of crime reduction reverberates in the language
and ideas Chicago political leaders used to support sentence enhancements for years to follow.
On July 22, 2017, 388 people had been murdered in Chicago since the start of the year. 246
Over the past two years, social services in the city were drastically cut, in part due to the Illinois
government’s failure to pass a budget and fund social services. In January 2016, the state’s largest
social service provider cut 30 programs and 750 positions; the State was more than $6 million
behind in promised payments to the organization. 247 Several violence prevention programs serving
Chicago residents lost their funding in 2015, and dozens of service providers across the state sued
the State for failing to pay them more than $160 million, resulting in program and service cuts. 248
Although HB2265 did not pass, its sponsors introduced variations of the bill in 2014, 249
250
2015, and 2016.251 Chicago’s political leaders continued to use Ludwig’s framework to argue for
longer gun sentences, claiming that the deterrent effect of extending imprisonments would reduce
violence. In February 2017, when 11-year-old Takiya Holmes was shot and killed in Chicago,
Police Superintendent Eddie Johnson tied her death to short gun sentences. “There’s no deterring
to taking a life when you know you’ll likely be out of jail in a matter of months,” Johnson said.
“How many children do we need to lose before the promises that were made by certain legislators
are kept? How many?”252 Mayor Rahm Emanuel continued to make similar arguments, claiming
that gang members don’t respect Chicago’s weak gun penalties. “The gang members know that
when it comes to judges, the courts and sentencing it’s a joke. And that should not exist,” Emanuel
said.253
Sustained advocacy ultimately led to a sentence enhancement bill, Senate Bill 1722, being
246
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passed in 2017. Making a prediction that far exceeded Ludwig’s estimates, Police Superintendent
Johnson testified at a House committee hearing that the proposed bill, if passed, would lead to a 50
percent reduction in Chicago gun violence within three years. 254 He drew on the language of
deterrence and punishment-certainty, stating, “[Gun carriers are] released back to the streets so
quickly that they see no reason to change their behavior,” and, “[t]he purpose is to create a culture
of accountability.”255 Governor Bruce Rauner signed the bill on June 23, 2017.256 The new law
increases the sentence for illegal gun possession for some individuals previously convicted of
felonies to seven-to-fourteen years.257 The bill allows judges to impose shorter sentences by
providing a written explanation for the deviation. 258
In an article titled, “A Law to Make Thugs Think Twice Before Shooting,” the Chicago
Tribune’s editorial board praised the new bill, adopting the same deterrence/incapacitation logic
used in Ludwig’s memo. “This measure should send a message to violent criminals, gang members
among them, that getting caught with a gun may well cost more time in jail. Therefore some may
think twice about carrying—and firing—weapons,” they wrote. “And for those who ignore the
warning, the consequence still may benefit the rest of us: The longer period of time dangerous
people sit behind bars, the more days and nights they are not on the streets, potentially firing their
weapons.”259 The logic of incapacitation and deterrence has no need to take account of racial
segregation, abandoned neighborhoods, hungry families, and over-policed communities. Instead,
the scope of analysis is limited to the “bad guys” of the world and the question of how to motivate
them at the margins.
Chicago politicians continue to frame the gun violence problem in terms of punishment
and “accountability.” In July 2017, veteran Alderman Edward Burke introduced an ordinance to
punish parents who do not prevent their children from possessing firearms. 260 The ordinance would
require parents who know their children possess firearms to “make reasonable efforts” to remove
the weapon, or report their child to the police.261 Parents would be punished with community service
for failing to follow the ordinance.262 Alderman Burke stated, “We need to step forward and put in
place a system that holds parents accountable while providing them with support services.” 263 In
the Alderman’s view, parents are not sufficiently motivated by the desire to keep their families and
254
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communities safe; some punishment framework, however minor, is needed to “hold parents
accountable.”264
Chicago’s newest mayor, Lori Lightfoot, also relies on accountability and punishment
language in framing violence talk. Lightfoot was elected in April 2019 after running on a platform
of reform and police accountability. 265 Even as a liberal self-described reformer, Lightfoot has
chosen to use punishment and imprisonment framings when discussing violence. Arguing for more
pretrial jailing of people accused of gun possession crimes, Lightfoot said:
We can’t keep our communities safe if people just keep cycling through the
system because what that says to them is, I can do whatever I want, I can carry
whatever I want, I can shoot up a crowd and I’m going to be back on the street.
How does that make sense?266
Lightfoot emphasizes punishment-certainty and incapacitation, the two cornerstones of
Ludwig’s memorandum, in her argument. Lightfoot’s remarks could have been written by the Crime
Lab, circa 2013.
Punishment language shifts accountability for gun violence. Just like Police
Superintendent Johnson described the need for a “culture of accountability,” Alderman Burke points
the finger of responsibility at black families. Mayor Lightfoot points her finger at irresponsible,
perhaps uncaring judges. Punishment-based narratives are politically useful: they allow political
leaders to place the blame on others. Ludwig’s memorandum and his public support of sentence
enhancements strengthened these punishment-based narratives.
The primacy of punishment narratives prevents sentence enhancements from being
compared against other interventions. There are promising strategies like reducing gun
trafficking,267 changing policing practices,268 offering cognitive behavioral therapy, 269 and
providing jobs and other resources.270 Much of the best social science research supports these
264
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alternatives. For example, we know that networks of violence are stable over time even as
individuals are removed.271 If removing individuals from violence networks does not disrupt those
networks, it follows that policymakers cannot sustainably reduce violence just by taking people off
of the streets. But such nuances find no home in the punishment frame.
The logic of incapacitation has proven intuitive and resilient. It has not been difficult to
get political leaders to invest in policies that send more people to prison for longer periods of time.
The real challenge is getting them to invest in anything else. As mayors, aldermen, and police
superintendents understand, the punishment paradigm shifts accountability away from resource
providers and transfers it to police, judges, and jailers. And so, even after its foundation has been
dismantled, Ludwig’s legitimation of the punishment paradigm lives on. It lives in the stories we
tell about gun violence, in the prison cells where even more people will live, and in vacuums in
communities across the city.
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